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xviGeneral Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to closely analyze corporate tax
competition in Europe. Whereas most of the existing literature explores
corporate tax competition from a country level perspective, this disserta-
tion takes a di®erent approach. First, I analyze corporate tax competition
between regions within the borders of one country. And second the spatial
dimension of corporate tax rates in the EU is studied. For the ¯rst time
the new member states of the European Union (EU) are taken into account.
In addition, this thesis analyzes to what extent trade and/or taxes have
contributed to export specialization in Central and Eastern Europe.
This dissertation is divided in two parts. In a ¯rst part, I study whether
there is evidence of regional tax di®erences within countries. Whereas the
literature typically studies corporate taxes on the country level, in countries
with large regional disparities in terms of economic activity and develop-
ment, like Belgium and Italy, these di®erences can give rise to regional tax
heterogeneity. That is, while an identical ¯rm belonging to a particular
country is subject to the same corporate tax rate, there can be regional
di®erences in the tax base. Tax audits are another potential source of re-
gional tax di®erences as they tend to take place at the regional level rather
than at the national level. When the enforcement policy can di®er across
regions, taxes will be lower in the low enforcement region (Moesen et al.
(1994), Amerighi (2006), Peralta et al. (2006)). Especially regions that ¯nd
it harder to attract ¯rms due to disadvantageous geographical or economic
conditions, may opt for a milder enforcement policy, allowing for more ex-
penses to be deducted and ¯rms to pay less taxes. To study regional tax
heterogeneity, I look in chapters 1 and 2 to the case of Belgium and Italy.
1Introduction
My results seem to con¯rm that ¯rms in poorer regions tend to pay fewer
taxes.
In the second part of this thesis, I shift the focus from regional tax
competition to corporate tax competition between countries. For corporate
taxes in the EU, only a small set of articles has analyzed strategic competi-
tion. A ¯rst study is by Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002). They show that EU
countries strategically compete in corporate taxes with geographically close
countries and to a lesser extent with the US. Redoano (2003) concludes that
tax competition mainly occurs between geographically close countries using
corporate tax rates for 13 European countries during the period 1980-1995.
A third study looking exclusively at EU15 countries is from Ruiz & Gerard
(2007). These authors ¯nd only weak empirical evidence of strategic tax
competition in the EU15 during the period 1989-2001. My work however
contributes by focussing on the introduction of Central and East European
countries in the EU and its implications on country level taxation issues.
I revisit the question to what extent there is a spatial dimension in
corporate tax competition in the EU. That is, could it be that countries
like Germany and Austria, which are neighboring the low tax region of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, are subject to stronger tax competition than say
France or Belgium, located at a greater distance of the low tax new member
states? I explore these issues by estimating di®erent ¯scal reaction func-
tions depending on the distance to the low tax region Central and Eastern
Europe. Our econometrical analysis ¯nds evidence of the presence of such
spatial pattern in corporate taxes in the EU. The subsequent chapter on the
new EU member states discusses the trade behavior of the new EU mem-
ber states in their relation to the EU15. I investigate whether there is a
link between trade liberalization, tax di®erences and institutions on the one
hand and export specialization in Central and Eastern Europe on the other
hand. I provide evidence that both trade liberalization and institutions in-
°uence their export specialization, while taxes do not contribute to export
specialization in Central and Eastern Europe.
In the next section, I give a short overview of the contents of the dif-
ferent chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 1 uses a large ¯rm-level data
set on Belgian ¯rms to test which ¯rm characteristics matter in explaining
2Introduction
e®ective tax rates. The results are indicative for the presence of regional tax
di®erences, with a lower e®ective tax rate in the southern region Wallonia
than in the northern region Flanders. More precisely, the e®ective tax rate
in Wallonia is about 6 percent1 lower than in Flanders. I also ¯nd that
the average e®ective tax rate of capital region Brussels is also lower than
Flanders. A possible explanation for this is that Brussels had more coordi-
nation centres2 (1.2%) and foreign owned ¯rms (29.94%) in the period of my
analysis than the other regions. As for sectoral di®erences, this study shows
that Flanders has relatively low taxes in sectors such as tourism, recycling
and research & development, while sectors such as tobacco have a higher
than average rate. In some cases the below average e®ective tax rate can
be a re°ection of the statutory tax concessions that ¯rms in these sectors
enjoy, like in the case of the recycling-sector, in other sectors political fac-
tors probably matter as well. Interaction e®ects between the sector and the
region a ¯rm is located in show that Brussels has signi¯cant lower e®ective
tax rates for ¯rms in the leather and shoe industry and Wallonia in textiles,
leather and shoe industry compared to Flanders. In contrast, the recycling
sector in Brussels has a signi¯cant higher e®ective tax rate than on aver-
age. A ¯nal observation for Belgium is that e®ective tax rates have steadily
increased over the period 1993-2002. Especially at the end of the nineties,
when a new government took o±ce, the average e®ective tax rate increased
substantially. One possible explanation is that this government anticipated
the strong reduction in the statutory tax rate it introduced in December
2002. By widening the tax base in the years just before that reduction, the
e®ect on the country's budget is at least partly o®set and the impact on
the budget dampened3. From this study I conclude that the Belgium tax
system is not neutral across all ¯rms as there are important regional tax
di®erences in Belgium.
1This percentage is based on the estimation in column (1) of Table2 and is calculated as
follows: The coe±cient of the dummy Wallonia is 0.015 percentage points and the average
ETR of the sample is 0.2615 percentage points. Therefore, I can say that the ETR in
Wallonia is 6 percent lower than the ETR in Flanders.
2 A coordination centre is part of a multinational group, is involved in activities such
as ¯nancial or business support services and gets a lower tax base than domestic ¯rms.
3This result still holds when controlling for the value added by the ¯rm.Introduction
In chapter 2, Italy is another example of a country with large regional
di®erences. Moreover, its corporate tax rate exists of a tax on corporate
pro¯ts (IRPEG) and a tax on value added of business activities (IRAP),
where the regions can manipulate this 'IRAP' independently. Therefore,
the e®ective tax rate can di®er across regions because of a di®erent 'IRAP'
rate, but also because of region-speci¯c tax incentives. As a consequence,
this chapter can analyze the impact of ¯rm characteristics on the e®ective
tax rate of Italian companies. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the impact
of ¯rm characteristics on the e®ective tax rate of Italian companies. In
addition, it studies whether Italian regions set their tax rates strategically.
First, this study observes that companies in southern and mountain regions
Basilicata, Campania, Sicilia, Sardegna, Abruzzo, Lazio and Valle D'Aosta
have a signi¯cantly lower e®ective tax rate than the overall average e®ective
tax rate of 47.8 percent for the period 1993-2003. I also ¯nd empirical
evidence of strategic tax competition Italian regions for the e®ective tax rate
and for the IRAP rate is present. This implies that regional tax di®erences
can also be the result of strategic competition between regions.
Chapter 3 formally tests the presence of strategic tax settings in the old
EU15 as a reaction to changes in the corporate tax rates in the new member
states. First, a simple model of spatial tax competition is developed. This
model predicts an inverse relationship between how close old member states
are in geographic terms from the new member states and the toughness of
tax competition. Empirically, the results show that indeed corporate tax
competition is stronger for countries relatively closer to the low tax region
of the new member states like Germany and Austria than for old member
states further away from the new member states such as Spain, UK and
Portugal.
Chapter 4 analyzes the role of corporate tax rates in the export special-
ization of Central and East European countries. Theory has shown that a
government can use ¯scal policy to promote specialization in a few sectors.
Certain tax incentives can stimulate production and export. With respect
to specialization, traditional and new trade theories predict increasing spe-
cialization as trade costs are reduced. Moreover, a growing literature points
out the importance of institutions for trade and economic performance. This
4Introduction
chapter analyzes the empirical link between corporate taxes, trade integra-
tion, institutions and export specialization at the country level. For a set of
thirteen Central European countries over the period 1989-2000, the results
show the importance of trade integration and institutions on export special-
ization. That is, I ¯nd that a reduction in tari®s between EU15 and Central
Europe leads to increased export specialization in Central Europe. In addi-
tion, institutions stimulating enterprise reforms such as credit and subsidy
policies, speed up export specialization. Surprisingly, I ¯nd no evidence of
the role of corporate taxes.Chapter 1




Closer economic integration in the EU has increased capital mobility
and is considered responsible for the greater tax competition between coun-
tries. It has been argued that capital mobility will lead to a race to the
bottom in corporate tax rates as countries compete with each other to at-
tract ¯rms (Commission 1998). To do so, governments have several tools at
their disposal. They can either lower the statutory tax rate (STR), or they
can narrow the tax base for ¯rms. Kind et al. (2002) show that economic
integration makes the corporate tax base increasingly mobile and tax sen-
sitive, with downward pressure on tax rates as a result. Governments may
also target speci¯c companies or sectors and o®er them a preferential tax
treatment or speci¯c tax privileges (e.g., investment credits or tax rulings
for foreign investors). Alternatively, they may also decide to alter the fre-
0This chapter is based on co-authored work with H. Vandenbussche and B. Janssen and
was published as Vandenbussche, Crabb¶ e and Janssen (2006), 'Regional tax competition.
Firm level evidence for Belgium', De Economist, vol. 153(3), p257-276. (Vandenbussche
et al. 2005)
71.1. Introduction
quency and intensity of tax audits. More intensive tax auditing will make
¯rms more aware of their income declaration and is likely to increase the tax
base and the amount of taxes collected. This would show up in the "e®ective
tax rate" (ETR) which as opposed to the "statutory tax rate" (STR), also
accounts for the tax base. As we will explain below, the di®erence between
the STR and the ETR is a re°ection of the number of tax concessions a
country provides. In this paper we analyze the determinants of ¯rm level
ETR for large Belgian ¯rms. While the statutory tax rate is the same for all
these ¯rms, there is substantial heterogeneity in E®ective Tax Rates1. Our
analysis indicates that while tax concessions explain some of the variation in
E®ective Tax Rates, a large part of the variation can be attributed to other
more political factors, such as the size of a ¯rm and the region it is located
in. Sector membership and the federal government in o±ce also turn out to
be important factors in explaining the heterogeneity in ETRs. These more
political factors could re°ect either negotiated tax concessions or certain
political and economical objectives that a government is aiming to achieve
through its tax system. We ¯nd an average ETR of about 26%, which is 14%
lower than the STR of 40.17% in that same period. While the STR did not
change in the period we analyze, we do observe yearly changes in average
ETRs. Our results suggest that the average ETR has steadily increased in
the course of the nineties. Especially in the two years preceding the reduc-
tion in STR, we observe an increase in ETRs during the same government
period. One possible explanation for this is that the government anticipated
the strong reduction in STR it enacted in December 20022. By widening the
tax base in the years just before that reduction, the e®ect on the country's
budget is at least partly o®set and the impact on the budget dampened. In
view of the Maastricht criteria and the Stability pact governments are forced
to maintain budgetary discipline. Therefore when governments plan a lower
1A few other studies have analyzed ¯rm level ETRs using di®erent data sets such as
Buijinck et al. (2002), Buijinck et al. (2000), Huizinga & Nicodµ eme (2006), Janssen (2003)
and Nicodµ eme (2002).
2Belgium recently lowered its STR from 40.17% to 33.9% from the year 2003 onwards.
Many other EU countries have also lowered their STR. For example the STR of Italy was
reduced from 52.20% in 1993 to 40.25% in 2002. For Denmark the STR decreased from
36% in 1993 to 30% in 2002 (KPMG 2006).
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tax rate, widening the tax base is one way to sustain the level of tax revenue.
Hence, our results of increasing ETRs, especially at the end of the nineties,
may pick up an anticipatory e®ect of the decrease in the STR in 20023.
This is also con¯rmed by the macro-economic study of Baldwin & Krugman
(2004). They ¯nd that while most European countries have lowered their
STRs, the ratio of 'aggregate Tax income at the country level over GDP' did
not change much over time. Despite the reduction in nominal tax rates the
total tax income at the country level remained relatively stable, suggesting
that most countries had also widened their tax base. Although it is clear that
in many countries in Europe, regions within a country can di®er substan-
tially in terms of their economic development and attractiveness to ¯rms.
Belgium is a typical example of a country where the economic situation of
its 3 regions is very di®erent. While the 3 regions Flanders, Wallonia and
Brussels are relatively autonomous politically, their ¯scal policy is still very
much a federal issue. However, with an average unemployment rate of about
8% in Flanders compared to about 14% in Wallonia, the demand for an au-
tonomous ¯scal policy is growing. In a wider European context, economists
have been arguing that more peripheral countries such as Greece and Por-
tugal for example should be allowed to charge a lower corporate tax rate
in order to di®erentiate themselves from the 'core' countries in Europe for
the purpose of attracting ¯rms within their country borders. This argument
rests on the notion that ¯rms in the core countries are more willing to pay
higher taxes in return for better infrastructure, proximity to consumer mar-
kets, to suppliers and to other ¯rms to bene¯t from agglomeration spillovers.
Baldwin & Krugman (2004) for example have shown that tax revenue over
country GDP has not converged in Europe between the so called 'core' and
'periphery' countries. In this paper we examine whether within a country
such as Belgium with large economic disparities between its regions4, there
is any evidence of regional tax competition where the expectation would be
that the more peripheral region of Wallonia would have a lower e®ective tax
rate than the 'core' region Flanders. From a statutory point of view, ¯rms
3Devereux et al. (2002) also ¯nd that tax-cutting and base-broadening reforms usually
go hand in hand leaving the E®ective Tax Rates fairly stable over time.
4There are many other countries in Europe that consist of regions with very di®erent
economic growth rates i.e. Italy, Germany and the UK amongst others.1.2. Belgian Statutory Framework
in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels are subject to the same STR and the
same rules for the determination of the tax base apply. However, tax audits
and controls are decentralized. There are about one hundred and ¯fty four
regional tax o±ces scattered across the country responsible for tax audits
and controls. Previous research has shown that the e±ciency of these re-
gional o±ces tends to di®er substantially. More in particular Moesen et al.
(1994) used non-parametric techniques and developed an e±ciency index
for each regional o±ce where 'e±ciency of tax controls' was measured by a
number of variables including 'the number of ¯les handled', the 'complexity
of the ¯le' and the number of 'visits on the premises'. The ¯ndings obtained
in our paper suggest lower ETRs in Wallonia, compared to Flanders after
controlling for sectoral composition and ¯rm characteristics. This con¯rms
the results by Moesen et al. (1994) but in addition points out that these
e±ciency di®erences mainly seem to occur along regional lines with lower
e±ciency and enforcement in the Walloon area. A possible explanation for
that is the higher regional unemployment rate in Wallonia which puts this
region in a weaker position vis-µ a-vis foreign investors and domestic ¯rms,
which may result in lower enforcement. The remainder of this paper is struc-
tured as follows: the next section gives an overview of related literature of
the relevant statutory and accounting aspects of Belgian corporate taxation.
Section 2.3.3 gives a brief review of the di®erent measures of ETR. The col-
lection and analysis of the data are discussed in Section 2.4. In section 1.5 we
show some descriptive statistics. In section 1.6 we introduce the empirical
model and in Section 1.8 we discuss the main results. Section 2.7 consists
of some robustness checks. The last section concludes and summarizes the
main results.
1.2 Belgian Statutory Framework
In this section we explain the determinants of the statutory tax base
and the statutory tax concessions that applied in our period of investigation
1993-2002. The corporate income tax system in Belgium has a stepwise
progressive tax rate system with rates ranging from 28% up to 40.17%. All
Belgian ¯rms in our sample are large ¯rms subject to the highest STR. By
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considering ¯rms that fall within the same tax bracket, we control for the
level of the STR in our analysis. Hence when we observe heterogeneity
in ETRs between ¯rms, other factors than the STR must be responsible
for these observed di®erences. While we do not observe the tax base in our
data, we do observe the yearly pro¯ts by each ¯rm, which is taken by the tax
authorities as the starting point for determining the tax base. The statutory
tax base is determined as follows. First, from the annual income/pro¯t
¯gures that ¯rms report, the tax authority can reject a number of expenses,
which are not deemed to be true expenses of the period. This would enlarge
the tax base. Secondly, ¯rms can get a tax privilege for dividends received
from Belgian or foreign ¯rms (EU or non-EU) to avoid double taxation of
dividend income5. Thirdly, they can get a tax break for losses reported in
the past ('carry-forwards')6. And ¯nally, statutory tax concessions are also
granted for four types of investments: investments in patents, investments
in research & development, investments in energy-saving technology and
other investments7. The extent to which expenses are rejected by the tax
authority, as well as some of the statutory or negotiated tax concessions a
company enjoys can not be observed in our data. However, we do know the
total corporate 'tax liability' of the ¯rm in a particular year. A generally
accepted way of measuring the e®ective tax rate (ETR) is by relating the
¯rm level 'tax liability' to the 'pro¯ts before tax' (Buijinck et al. 2002). The
extent to which the ETR di®ers from the STR is indicative of how the tax
base di®ers from the reported 'pro¯ts before taxes' in our company accounts
data. If the e®ective rate lies below the statutory rate, which on average
is the case, the tax base is smaller than the reported earnings and the ¯rm
enjoys statutory or negotiated tax concessions and tax rulings.
5When the dividend is at least 5% of the disbursing companys capital, 95% of the divi-
dend revenue is free of Belgian corporate tax (Kerchove & Heirewegh 2003). For dividends
between parent and subsidiaries (minimum participation of 25%) in the European Union,
the EU Parent-Subsidiary directive applies (Commission 2000).
6The taxable income may be reduced with the losses of the previous periods. In
Belgium only losses can be deducted from future pro¯ts, this is called carry-forward of
losses (Kerchove & Heirewegh 2003).
7For the period we analyze (1993-2002), the tax concession for each of these investments
was 13.5% on the cost of the investment.1.3. E®ective Tax Rates
1.3 E®ective Tax Rates
E®ective Tax Rates can be computed in various ways. The measures
used in the literature di®er from each other in two respects: the aggregation
level of the data (micro- versus macro data), and the historic versus future
orientation of the methods. The somewhat older literature has looked at
E®ective Tax Rates based on macro-economic data by relating 'tax revenue'
to a country's 'Gross domestic product' (GDP). The downside of this ap-
proach is that with aggregate macro-economic data one cannot analyze ¯rm-
and sector-level heterogeneity in e®ective tax rates. More recent studies use
more micro-level data and de¯ne the e®ective tax rate at the ¯rm level.
In view of our access to ¯nancial statements data, our preferred approach
in this paper is the micro-level one, allowing us to study ¯rm and sector
heterogeneity in the Belgian tax system. The other di®erence in the use of
E®ective Tax Rates is the time orientation and the real-life nature of the
data used. Backward-looking tax rates use historic real-life data to esti-
mate the tax burden of a company while forward-looking tax rates consider
the tax burden associated with future hypothetical investment decisions.
While the advantage of a backward-looking e®ective tax rate is that it is
relatively easy to construct, its use does not only re°ect a country's tax in-
centives embedded in the law but also re°ects a country's enforcement policy
(Nicodµ eme 2002). The forward looking method considers the tax burden on
a hypothetical investment project8. This approach was ¯rst developed by
King & Fullerton (1983) and is particularly suited to investigate ¯rms' fu-
ture incentives to invest given a particular tax structure. However, the use
of forward looking rates is more complicated to implement empirically be-
cause its calculation relies on a hypothetical and speci¯c type of investment,
using a speci¯c source of ¯nancing. Therefore, the forward tax rate does not
take on board all aspects incorporated in a country's tax system9. In view
of the research questions we analyze in this paper and the data that we have
at our disposal, we opted for the micro backward looking e®ective tax rate
method where the e®ective tax rate (ETR) is de¯ned as the ratio of ¯rm
8For a good discussion of the forward looking rates we refer to Devereux et al. (2002).
9In Devereux et al. (2002) the type of investment considered is on plant and machinery
¯nanced by equity.
12CHAPTER 1. CORPORATE TAX DIFFERENCES IN BELGIUM
level corporate taxes in a particular year over the pro¯ts in that same year.
This ETR will be used as the dependent variable in our empirical model,
where the right hand side variables will consist of ¯rm characteristics, sector
dummies and location variables. A possible endogeneity problem that is in-
herent when using the backward-looking e®ective tax rate will be overcome
by lagging some of the ¯rm level investment variables as explained in section
1.1.
1.4 Data
We use a rich panel dataset of 12,197 large Belgian ¯rms over a period
of 10 years from 1993-2002, which results in more than 100,000 observations.
These data were obtained from a commercial database BELFIRST which
contains the population of Belgian ¯rms. In view of the progressive nature
of the corporate tax system in Belgium, we decide to include only the large
¯rms in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. Or, in other
words, we included ¯rms that are subject to an STR of 40.17% or above
in the period we analyze10. By only considering ¯rms in the highest tax
bracket we control for the level of STR. Any di®erence in E®ective Tax
Rates we observe in the data therefore stem from other factors than the STR.
We excluded ¯nancial institutions such as banks and insurance companies,
because they are subject to a di®erent set of accounting rules and reporting
standards. Our analysis is based on unconsolidated company accounts11
and we do not include negative ETR observations and e®ective taxes higher
than 100% as in Collins & Shackelford (2003). The regional composition
of the data is as follows: 22.5% of the ¯rms in our sample are located
in Brussels, 16% in Wallonia and 61% of the ¯rms is located in Flanders.
While the BELFIRST data set contains data for the years 1989 to 2002,
the availability varies between years. Especially, the availability of data for
the years 1989-1992 is very limited. Therefore, we decided to focus on the
10According to the EU directive, a company is large when it has on average more than
100 employees or when it exceeds one of the following criteria: employees > 50, sales (VAT
exclusive) > 6 250 000 euro, total assets > 3 125 000 euro.
11In Belgium there is no ¯scal consolidation, hence the unconsolidated accounts are used
to determine tax liabilities.1.5. Descriptive Statistics
period 1993-2002 for our analysis.
1.5 Descriptive Statistics
In the literature the e®ective tax rate (ETR) is referred to as a micro
backward-looking measure of corporate tax pressure (Devereux et al. 2002).
This variable will be our dependent variable in the regression analysis in the
next section. Table 1.1 presents some descriptive statistics (mean, median,
standard deviation) for the ETR per region. A ¯rst observation is that while
the ETR for large Belgian ¯rms is 26%, the median ETR is somewhat higher
and lies around 29%. A study of Buijinck et al. (2002) ¯nds an average
ETR for Belgium of 21.64%, which is pretty similar to our ¯ndings. Second,
while in principle all large Belgian ¯rms are subject to the same statutory
tax rate, the standard errors in Table 1.1 indicate that there seems to be
substantial ¯rm heterogeneity in ETRs. Also, on the basis of Table 1.1
we would be inclined to conclude that the average ETR in Wallonia and
Brussels is somewhat lower than for Flanders. The median ETRs are even
more suggestive of regional tax di®erences. The very low median ETR for
Brussels is probably due to the high number of coordination centers that are
residing in Brussels12: 1.2% of the companies in Brussels are coordination
centers, while this is only 0.61% and 0.38% of the companies in Flanders and
Wallonia respectively. Therefore, at this stage in the analysis we can not
exclude the possibility that these regional di®erences in Table 1.1 are due to
coordination centers or to a di®erent sectoral composition of the regions. In
the regression analysis in section 1.7, we will test for signi¯cant di®erences
in ETRs between regions in a more formal way.
Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the average ETRs per Nace-Bel 2-digit
level sector and per region. The bold vertical line in Figure 1.1 represents
the overall average ETR across sectors. We note that there is a lot of
heterogeneity between sectors within one region. Also within one sector
there is substantial variation in ETR depending on the region the ¯rm is
located in. Flanders has relatively low taxes in sectors such as tourism
12A coordination center is part of a multi-national and involve activities such as ¯nancial
or business support services and get a lower tax rate than domestic ¯rms.
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Table 1.1: Average E®ective Tax Rates by Region, Belgium
ETR1 Flanders Wallonia Brussels Total
Mean 0.2699 0.2594 0.2402 0.2615
median 0.3239 0.2767 0.1579 0.2917
std. dev. 0.2537 0.2467 0.2583 0.2464
N observations 58,816 15,406 21,546 95,768
(hotels), recycling and research & development (R&D), while sectors such
as tobacco have a higher than average rate. In many sectors the e®ective
tax rate (ETR) in Wallonia is lower than the one in Flanders (telecom,
real estate, metals, cokes, clothing, chemicals, rubber). But notably in IT,
furniture, utilities, transportation and o±ce supplies, the ETR is higher in
Wallonia than in Flanders. While in some cases the below average ETR can
be a re°ection of the statutory tax concessions that ¯rms in these sectors
enjoy, like in the case of the recycling-sector, it is far less easy to explain
the average ETR level in other sectors. One possible explanation is that the
government through the tax system is either encouraging or discouraging
certain activities. In the regression analysis in section 1.7 we will include 33
sector dummies to control for sector e®ects in addition to ¯rm characteristics
to explain the variation in ¯rm level ETRs13.
1.6 The Model and Variable De¯nitions
The empirical model we introduce in this section closely follows the
literature by including ¯rm characteristics and sector dummies to explain
¯rm level ETRs Huizinga & Nicodµ eme (2006); Nicodµ eme (2002); Gupta &
Newberry (1997); Buijinck et al. (2000), Buijinck et al. (2002). In addition to
this literature we also include year dummies, location dummies and statutory
tax concessions. The empirical speci¯cation we test has the following general
13 In the regressions in section 1.7, we include 33, 2-digit NACE-BEL sector dummies
where we drop the 'Optical & Clockworks'-sector, because its ETR is closest to the average
ETR across all sectors. The sector dummies should therefore be interpreted relative to
the average ETR in 'optical & clockworks'.1.6. The Model and Variable De¯nitions
Figure 1.1: Heterogeneity in average E®ective Tax Rates in Belgium
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form,
etrit = ¯0 + ¯1firmsizeit + ¯2statutoryit + ¯3regioni (1.1)
+¯4yeart + ¯5sectori + »it
where the dependent variable, ETR, is the e®ective tax rate of ¯rm i
in year t.
In the literature ¯rm size has predominantly been measured by the log
of total assets. According to Gupta & Newberry (1997) there are two op-
posing theories regarding the e®ect of ¯rm size on ¯rm level ETRs. On the
one hand, the 'political cost theory' argues that large ¯rms have a higher
visibility which means they are more scrutinized which may result in higher
tax burdens. As a consequence larger ¯rms face higher ETRs. On the other
hand there is 'the political power theory' that argues that larger ¯rms have
greater resources to in°uence the political process and therefore larger ¯rms
are expected to face lower ETRs. Nicodµ eme (2002) uses 'turnover' as a size
variable. Theoretically he derives a positive relationship between a ¯rm's
turnover and its tax liability, suggesting that bigger ¯rms would pay more
taxes. However, empirically he ¯nds a negative relationship between size
variables and tax liabilities, suggesting that larger ¯rms pay lower taxes. In
view of the ambiguous results for the di®erent size variables in the litera-
ture, we will proxy size by using both the log of total assets and the log of
total employment (employment) as di®erent proxies for size in our speci¯-
cations. We further include a set of variables accounting for a number of
statutory tax breaks (statutory) such as: capital intensity (capital intens),
long term leverage (Ltleverage) and R&D expenses (R&D intens). The cap-
ital intensity (capital intens) of a company is de¯ned as the ratio of ¯xed
tangible assets over total assets. This variable can a®ect ETR through the
tax treatment of depreciation14 or through the tax breaks for investments
(see footnote 7). Long-term leverage is de¯ned as the ratio of long-term
debt over total assets. One reason for including this variable is that interest
payments on debt are fully deductible as long as the creditor is a ¯nancial
company institution Kerchove & Heirewegh (2003). As discussed above,
14Depreciation is an expense of the period and lowers the tax base.1.6. The Model and Variable De¯nitions
there is also a tax concession for R&D investments and patents. This is the
main reason for including the R&D intens variable which is de¯ned as the
ratio of intangible ¯xed assets over total assets. Another variable control-
ling for statutory tax concessions is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a
¯rm is a coordination center (coord. center). All variables in the statutory-
group are expected to lower the e®ective tax rate of the company. To con-
trol for regional di®erences in ETRs we include two regional dummies. One
with a value of 1 if a ¯rm is located in Brussels and zero otherwise and one
with a value of 1 if a ¯rm is located in Wallonia and zero otherwise (Flan-
ders is the reference variable). To analyze the yearly evolution of ETRs
over the period we include 9 year dummies (y1994-y2002) with 1993 as the
reference year15. Finally to control for sector heterogeneity we include 33
sector dummies at two-digit Nace-Bel level. We also include an error term
(»it) to control for white noise. In the next section we report the results
of an Ordinary Least squares (OLS) regression where we take into account
that ¯rm observations in consecutive years are not independent observations
which may result in autocorrelation. Therefore we use a cluster estimation
technique that clusters ¯rm observations over time using a unique company
identi¯er. 'Clustering' controls for the possible autocorrelation of ¯rm ob-
servations over time. In addition we use a 'robust' regression technique to
control for potential heteroskedasticity16. This renders the standard errors
into robust standard errors. As a robustness check in section 1.8, we will
use a ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation where we allow for a ¯rm-speci¯c intercept.
This implies that in expression 1.1, ¯0 is replaced by ¯i where subscript i
refers to an individual ¯rm. By including an intercept for each individual
¯rm, we implicitly control for ¯rms speci¯c factors that are unobservable
or not included in our analysis but that may a®ect the e®ective tax rate
and which is quite common to use in micro-econometrics using ¯rm level
data. Examples of ¯rm level ¯xed e®ects are the ability of the manager, the
quality of the auditor, the political clout of a ¯rm, etc.
15We have also experimented with including the age of a ¯rm, but this variable never
turned out to be signi¯cant and was therefore dropped from the analysis.
16In the 'robust' regression technique our statistical software package STATA uses the
Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of standard errors
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1.7 Empirical Results
In this section we discuss our main results. Table 1.2 reports the main
OLS regression results for model (1), using all observations for the period
1993-2002. In column (1) we use the logarithm of total assets as a ¯rm size
variable, while column (2) gives the same regression but where we use the
log of employment as a proxy for ¯rm size. While the level of 'employment'
consistently shows up with a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient, this is less
the case with 'total assets', where the sign and signi¯cance is much more
sensitive to the type of speci¯cation used. In view of these ambiguous results,
it is hard to draw strong conclusions regarding the relationship between ¯rm
size and the e®ective tax rate. The only conclusion that is relatively robust is
that Belgian tax incentives seem to go against the interests of labor intensive
¯rms, since higher employment levels are associated with higher ETRs.
More encouraging is that all the statutory-variables come with the ex-
pected sign. Highly leveraged ¯rms with many interest expenses have lower
ETRs, as well as ¯rms that invest in R&D. Capital intensive ¯rms have
lower ETRs as a result of higher depreciations. Also, we ¯nd evidence of
regional tax competition. Both Brussels and the dummy for Wallonia are
negative and signi¯cant, suggesting a lower average ETR in these regions
than in Flanders. Note that this regional di®erence is obtained after control-
ling for sector composition and ¯rm characteristics which may be di®erent
between the two regions. The results in Table 1.2 also con¯rm that ¯rms
in coordination centers have a lower ETR. The year-dummies we included
are all positive and signi¯cant. This suggests that corporate tax burden has
been rising since 1993. The coe±cients indicate that the strongest increase
has occurred in the most recent years. More in particular in the three years
before 2002, the year in which the STR was reduced to 33.99%17, the e®ec-
tive tax rate rose substantially. From 1999 onwards, the year when a new
government took o±ce that promised tax rate reductions, the E®ective Tax
Rates rose most substantially. A possible explanation is that during that
period, the tax base was widened gradually, to anticipate the large reduction
in STR that the same government enacted at the end of its term in o±ce in
17The reduced STR applied from the ¯scal year 2003 onwards.1.7. Empirical Results
December 200218.
One drawback of our approach is that there is potential endogeneity
problem in the sense that low ETRs may give rise to lower levels of some of
the ¯rm level investment variables. The appropriate way to address this is to
use instruments, typically the variable lagged by one year. In column (3) of
Table 1.2, we run a speci¯cation where we use lagged values of total assets
in the denominator for the right hand side variables possibly causing the
endogeneity (capital intens, LTleverage, R&D intens). Both the regional
e®ects (lower ETRs for Brussels and Wallonia than in Flanders) and the
rising ETRs over time especially in the years prior to 2002, go through,
suggesting that this potential endogeneity problem is not too serious.
Some authors have used a di®erent de¯nition of the e®ective tax rate.
Huizinga & Nicodµ eme (2006) have used the ratio of 'Income Tax' over 'total
Assets'. Column (4) of Table 1.2 shows the results of model (1) where we
use this de¯nition of ETR (etr2). The ¯rm size variable 'total assets' now
becomes negative and signi¯cant, but most of our results are robust to the
use of etr2 as a dependent variable. However, the dummy for Brussels turns
insigni¯cant, while the dummy for Wallonia continues to be negative and
strongly signi¯cant. In our view etr2 is somewhat less suited to capture
the extent of tax concessions, since there is no direct link between a ¯rm's
total assets and the tax rate it is subject to, which is why our preferred
speci¯cation remains the ones with etr1 as a dependent variable. Also the use
of etr2 can induce endogeneity problems as many right hand side variables
of the model speci¯cation in (1) are also scaled by total assets. Again using
lagged values of total assets in the denominator for the right hand side
variables possibly causing the endogeneity (capital intens, LTleverage, R&D
intens) did not change our main ¯ndings, but will not be reported here for
brevity.
18Also in other European countries reductions in STR have coincided with an enlarge-
ment of the tax base (Devereux et al. 2002).
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Table 1.2: Main Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets Employment Lags etr2
Total assets 0.003* - - -0.002***
[0.002] [0.003]
Employment - 0.016*** 0.017*** -
[0.002] [0.002]
Ltleverage -0.007*** -0.008** -0.00001** -0.0006
[0.002] [0.004] [4.78e-06] [0.0006]
Capital intens -0.05* -0.05* -0.00002* -0.007*
[0.027] [0.028] [0.00001] [0.004]
R&D intens -0.24*** -0.249*** -0.00004 -0.023***
[0.03] [0.036] [0.0001] [0.004]
Coordin. cenre -0.123*** -0.148*** -0.133*** -0.006***
[0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.002]
Brussels -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 0.0002
[0.007] [0.008] [0.01] [0.001]
Wallonia -0.015** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.003***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.001]
Y1994 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.002***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.001]
Y1995 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.003***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.001]
Y1996 0.018*** 0.02*** 0.022*** 0.003***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.001]
Y1997 0.02*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.004***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.001]
Y1998 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.006***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.001]
Y1999 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.007***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.001]
Y2000 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.007***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]1.7. Empirical Results
Table 1.2: Main Regression Results, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets Employment Lags etr2
Y2001 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.007***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.001]
Y2002 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.009***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.001]
Extr. nat. resource 0.009 0.003 0.006 -0.001
[0.036] [0.04] [0.038] [0.005]
Food products -0.026 -0.044* -0.042* -0.003
[0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.004]
Tobacco 0.179*** 0.16*** 0.172*** 0.049*
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025]
Textiles -0.063** -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.009**
[0.03] [0.031] [0.031] [0.004]
Clothing & furs -0.023 -0.046 -0.034 -0.003
[0.043] [0.046] [0.046] [0.008]
Leather & shoes 0.008 -0.008 0.006 -0.005
[0.079] [0.081] [0.082] [0.012]
Wood & cork -0.023 -0.024 -0.017 -0.016***
[0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.003]
Paper -0.012 -0.039 -0.032 -0.003
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.004]
Publishing -0.011 -0.025 -0.015 0.001
[0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.004]
Cokes -0.083 -0.111* -0.1 -0.004
[0.059] [0.062] [0.063] [0.005]
Chemicals -0.005 -0.022 -0.018 0.005
[0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.004]
Rubber -0.037 -0.058* -0.051* 0.002
[0.028] [0.029] [0.03] [0.005]
Non-metal prod. -0.036 -0.052* -0.048* -0.002
[0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.004]
Metals -0.094*** -0.114*** -0.11*** -0.008
[0.032] [0.034] [0.034] [0.004]
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Table 1.2: Main Regression Results, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets Employment Lags etr2
Prod. metal prod. -0.017 -0.03 -0.026 -0.002
[0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.004]
Machines -0.009 -0.028 -0.018 -0.001
[0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.004]
O±ce supplies 0.007 -0.016 -0.002 -0.003
[0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.006]
Elec. Machines 0.024 -0.001 0.007 0.005
[0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.005]
Audio & TV equip. -0.062* -0.089** -0.086* 0.003
[0.036] [0.039] [0.041] [0.006]
Cars -0.021 -0.046 -0.045 0.007
[0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.007]
Product. Transport -0.049 -0.08 -0.074 -0.001
[0.058] [0.058] [0.062] [0.006]
Furniture 0.011 -0.01 -0.003 -0.003
[0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.005]
Recycling -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.008
[0.041] [0.041] [0.042] [0.007]
Elec. gas & water -0.065 -0.078 -0.064 -0.002
[0.059] [0.063] [0.063] [0.007]
Construction 0.057*** 0.048* 0.064*** -0.006*
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.003]
Car sales 0.021 0.014 0.027 0.0001
[0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.003]
Hotels -0.12*** -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.01***
[0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.004]
Transportation -0.02 -0.03 -0.024 -0.008**
[0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.004]1.7. Empirical Results
Table 1.2: Main Regression Results, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets Employment Lags etr2
Telecom -0.096** -0.101** -0.112*** -0.003
[0.046] [0.048] [0.048] [0.008]
IT -0.013 -0.022 -0.014 0.004
[0.028] [0.029] [0.03] [0.005]
R&D -0.119** -0.141*** -0.147*** -0.015***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.059] [0.005]
Real estate -0.039* -0.018 -0.004 -0.007**
[0.023] [0.025] [0.025] [0.003]
Publ. admin. -0.047* -0.054* -0.053* -0.005
[0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.004]
Constant 0.228*** 0.207*** 0.176*** 0.039***
[0.028] [0.250] [0.025] [0.004]
Observations 27290 25683 25656 27290
R 4.46% 4.88% 3.88% 3.82%
F-statistic 13.55 14.28 14.06 9.69
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
robust standard errors are between brackets; *= signi¯cance level at
10%, **= signi¯cance level at 5%, ***= signi¯cance level at 1%
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1.8 Robustness Checks
Table 1.3 reports some robustness checks. We start in column (1) by re-
porting the outcome of a dynamic speci¯cation where we include the lagged
value of etr1 as an additional explanatory variable on the right hand side to
control for possibly autocorrelation. However, our main variables of interest
namely the regional e®ects and the time e®ects remain intact. In column
(2) of Table 1.3 we report the results of a censored tobit regression that
takes into account that etr1 is a truncated variable19. Another common
way to control for outliers is where we cut-o® all ETR observations larger
or smaller than twice the standard deviation of the mean ETR. The results
of this regression are shown in column (3) of Table 1.3 but our results re-
main qualitatively the same. In column (4) we control for carry-forwards of
losses which applies under Belgian law, by including a variable (LOSSt¡1)
to capture last year's losses. However, this variable is not signi¯cant in the
regression and the other results go through. The results of a ¯xed e®ect
estimation is reported in column (5). Controlling for ¯rm level ¯xed e®ects
is very common in micro-econometrics. These ¯xed e®ects control for a
number of unobservables at the ¯rm level that may a®ect ETRs and that
if not controlled for may introduce an omitted variables bias. The ¯xed
e®ects estimation does not change the simple OLS results. All the ¯rm level
variables and year e®ects continue to hold20. We also experimented with
a random e®ects model but the Hausman-test decided in favor of the ¯xed
e®ects model as the most preferred speci¯cation. The variables capturing
the regional tax competition in Belgium continue to be negative but the
signi¯cance for Wallonia is stronger than for Brussels.
And as a ¯nal robustness check, we introduce a speci¯cation where we
replace the year dummies by dummies for three distinct periods in Belgian
politics. While both the periods '93-94 and '95-98 coincide with a federal
coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists, the last period '99-2002
19The distribution of etr1s is shown in Figure 1.2 in the Appendix. The kernel density
estimates for etr1 is bimodal around 0 and 40.17%, suggesting that many companies do
not pay positive taxes because they makes losses or zero pro¯ts and also that a substantial
number of companies have an ETR about equal to the STR.
20Regional dummy variables are not possible to include with ¯xed e®ects.1.8. Robustness Checks
coincides with a coalition of Liberal Democrats and Socialists. For each of
these di®erent governments we introduce a separate dummy (labeled Gov1,
Gov2, Gov3) with a value of 1 for years in power, and zero otherwise.
The last column in Table 1.3 shows the results of this speci¯cation
where we dropped the ¯rst period dummy Gov1; hence the coe±cients on
the two other dummies are relative to the ¯rst period in our data. Both
Gov2 and Gov3 are positive and signi¯cant, with the magnitude of the Gov3
variable twice the size of the Gov2 dummy. This implies that the E®ective
Tax Burden has increased most under the last government, probably in
anticipation of the large reduction in STR in 2002 that this same government
enacted. To test whether the time e®ects are due to federal government
policy and not to business cycle e®ects, we use a likelihood ratio- and an F-
test. Both these tests could not reject the null hypothesis that the signi¯cant
time e®ects are indeed due to federal policy measures21 .
21We use a likelihood-ratio test and an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the
coe±cients of the time dummies within a government period are not signi¯cantly di®erent
from each other. The test statistic for the likelihood-ratio test equals 4.69, which is lower
than the critical value at the 1% level of 15.086. The F-statistic, based on the R of the two
regressions, was equal to 0.216 (critical value at the 1% level = 3.78). As a result, both
tests do not reject the null hypothesis that the coe±cients of the time dummies within a
government period are equal to each other. This implies that our results are rather due
to the government in o±ce during these years rather than to business cycle e®ects.
26CHAPTER 1. CORPORATE TAX DIFFERENCES IN BELGIUM
Table 1.3: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
etr1t¡1 Censored Filter Carry forward Fixed e®ects Gov.
etrt¡1 0.545*** - - - - -
[0.007]
Employment 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.015***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001]
Ltleverage -0.004 -0.016*** -0.002*** -0.008** -0.002 -0.008***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003]
Capital intens -0.025* -0.083*** -0.043* -0.047* -0.01* -0.047*
[0.015] [0.006] [0.024] [0.028] [0.005] [0.027]
R&D intens -0.145*** -0.451*** -0.27*** -0.254*** -0.118*** -0.25***
[0.022] [0.03] [0.028] [0.036] [0.028] [0.036]
Coord. center -0.074*** -0.11*** -0.115*** -0.148*** - -0.147***
[0.015] [0.025] [0.021] [0.027] [0.027]
Losst¡1 - - - -0.001 - -
[0.005]
Brussels -0.003 -0.011* -0.02*** -0.004 - -0.003
[0.005] [0.06] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Wallonia -0.007* -0.025*** -0.014* -0.016** - -0.015***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Y1994 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.021*** -
[0.007] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Y1995 0.027*** 0.024** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.016*** -
[0.007] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Y1996 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.02*** 0.023*** -
[0.007] [0.011] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Y1997 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.024*** -
[0.01] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Y1998 0.033*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.022*** -
[0.010] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005]
Y1999 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.025*** -
[0.007] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005]1.8. Robustness Checks
Table 1.3: Robustness Checks, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
etr1t¡1 Censored Filter Carry forward Fixed e®ects Gov.
Y2000 0.036*** 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.021*** -
[0.007] [0.01] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Y2001 0.038*** 0.063*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.019*** -
[0.007] [0.011] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Y2002 0.036*** 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.02*** -
[0.011] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Gov2 - - - - - 0.013***
[0.004]
Gov3 - - - - - 0.028***
[0.005]
Sector-dummies yes yes Yes yes yes Yes
Constant 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.175*** 0.207*** 0.156*** 0.215***
[0.015] [0.019] [0.022] [0.025] [0.012] [0.024]
Observations 25683 26477 27162 25683 25683 25683
R 33.29% 6.01% 4.74% 4.88% 0.60% 4.8%
F-statistic 174.54 13.69 14.00 9.28 16.14
robust standard errors are between brackets; *= signi¯cance level at
10%, **= signi¯cance level at 5%, ***= signi¯cance level at 1%
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1.9 Conclusion
This paper is the ¯rst to investigate the determinants of E®ective Tax
Rates (ETRs) for Belgium using company level data for large ¯rms for the
period 1993-2002. We found evidence of regional tax competition between
the Northern region and the Southern region of the country, with lower aver-
age E®ective Tax Rates (ETR) in the peripheral region Wallonia compared
to the more 'core' region Flanders. In addition, our ¯ndings indicate that
E®ective Tax Rates for large Belgian companies have steadily increased over
the period 1993-2002. Especially at the end of the nineties, when a new gov-
ernment took o±ce, the average e®ective tax rate rose substantially. One
possible explanation for this is that this government anticipated the strong
reduction in STR it enacted in December 2002. By widening the tax base
in the years just before that reduction, the e®ect on the country's budget
is at least partly o®set and the impact on the budget dampened. Hence,
our results of increasing ETRs, may pick up an anticipatory e®ect of the
decrease in the STR in 2002.
Our data consisted of large Belgian ¯rms all subject to the highest
statutory tax rate (STR) of 40.17%. However, the average E®ective Tax
Rates (ETR) which takes into account the tax base, lies substantially below
that and for the more than 12,000 ¯rms in our sample averages around 26%.
Moreover, ETRs di®er substantially between ¯rms, sectors and regions. La-
bor intensive ¯rms pay relatively more taxes than capital intensive ¯rms.
Also, capital structure and R&D-intensity strongly a®ect the e®ective tax
rate. In terms of sectoral di®erences, we ¯nd 'socially desirable sectors' such
as tourism, recycling and R&D to pay relatively lower taxes than less so-
cially desirable sectors such as for instance the 'Tobacco' sector. Based on
the ¯ndings in this paper we can conclude that Belgian corporate taxation is
not neutral with respect to ¯rm size, the source of ¯nancing and geographic
location.1.10. Appendix
1.10 Appendix
Table 1.4: Sectors, 2-digit level of Nace-Bel code
Sector Nace-Bel code Obs Flanders Obs Wallonia
extraction of natural resources 10,11,12,13,14 647 376
food products 15 2822 680
Tobacco 16 80 10
Textiles 17 1461 186
clothing and furs 18 355 7
leather and shoes 19 17 10
wood and cork 20 499 162
Paper 21 551 149
Publishing 22 861 466
Cokes 23 87 28
Chemicals 24 1484 632
Rubber 25 1137 246
non-metal minerals 26 1477 586
Metals 27 423 382
production of metal products 28 2054 533
Machines 29 1440 477
o±ce supplies 30 124 10
electrical machines 31 604 163
audio and television equipment 32 259 81
optical and clocks 33 177 87
Cars 34 481 81
production of transport means 35 122 59
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Sector Nace-Bel code Obs Flanders Obs Wallonia
Furniture 36 1048 106
Recycling 37 236 118
Utilities 40,41 52 30
Construction 45 3697 1279
car sales 50,51,52 19445 4738
Hotels 55 463 102
Transportation 60,61,62,63 5726 732
Telecom 64 59 14
IT 65,66,67,72 894 243
R&D 73 47 18
real estate activities 70,71,74 8521 2059
public administration 75,85,90,91,92,93,99 1015 4311.10. Appendix
Table 1.5: Correlation Matrix
etr1 etr2 total employ- LT capital R&D coord. Brussels
assets ment leverage intens intens center
Wallonia -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.003 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.27
Brussels -0.02 0.002 0.04 -0.02 0.003 -0.05 0.08 0.04 1
coord. center -0.05 -0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.002 -0.04 -0.03 1 0.04
R&D intens -0.08 -0.04 -0.1 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 1 -0.03 0.08
capital intens -0.1 -0.08 -0.001 0.01 0.06 1 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
LTleverage -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 1 0.06 0.02 -0.002 0.003
employment 0.08 0.02 0.65 1 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
total assets -0.02 -0.1 1 0.65 -0.02 -0.001 -0.1 0.16 0.04
etr2 0.45 1 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.002
Table 1.6: Data-Appendix
etr1 Corporate tax expenses/ pro¯t before taxes
etr2 Corporate tax expenses/ total assets
Brussels =1 if in Brussels, =0 otherwise
Wallonia =1 if in Wallonia, =0 otherwise
total assets log(total assets)
employment log(employment )
capital intens tangible ¯xed assets/ total assets
LTleverage total LT debt/ total assets
R&D intens Intangible ¯xed assets/ total assets
coord. center =1 if coordination center (Nace-Bel=74152), =0 otherwise
sectors 33 sector dummies at 2- digits Nace-Bel (=0 if optical and clocks sector)
Y1994 - Y2002 9 Year dummies (=0 if 1993)
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Italy is a typical example of a European country with large regional
di®erences. The regions in the center-north have high levels of development
and low unemployment rates (around 6%), while the Mezzogiorno (the south
and the islands) has high unemployment rates around 21% up to 50% in some
areas in 2002. These di®erences is what we call a core-periphery structure.
The regions in the center-north are the 'core', while the south, the islands
and some mountain regions in the north are the 'periphery'. To solve this
unemployment problem, the Italian government provides incentives such as
tax credits on new investments (until 2006) and loans at low interest rates
to attract new industrial companies to southern Italy and certain depressed
mountain regions in northern Italy. But also other di®erences in tax in-
centives and variety in enforcement amongst regions will result in regional
di®erences of the e®ective tax rate (ETR).
This chapter will analyze regional di®erences in the e®ective tax rate of
Italian companies and investigate whether regions strategically compete over
e®ective tax rates to attract capital to their jurisdiction. On the one hand,
core regions can set a higher tax rate in comparison to peripheral regions,
because ¯rms in the core bene¯t from a well developed infrastructure and
352.1. Introduction
agglomeration spillovers (Baldwin & Krugman 2004). On the other hand,
when the tax gap between core and periphery becomes too large, ¯rms will
consider moving to the periphery. Therefore, the core is also limited in its
tax setting. Taking into account ¯rm and sector characteristics, results show
that companies in southern and mountain regions Basilicata, Campania,
Sicilia, Sardegna, Abruzzo, Lazio and Valle D'Aosta have a signi¯cant lower
e®ective tax rate than the overall average e®ective tax rate of 47.8 percent.
The main goal of this chapter to study wether these regional tax di®erences
are a result of strategic behavior of the Italian regions. In the literature the
method to test for strategic interaction amongst regions is a ¯scal reaction
function. If regions set their tax rates interdependent, the ¯scal reaction
function will have a nonzero slope. This chapter will use di®erent measures
of neighbors and in addition will analyze the strategic behavior in tax setting
between the core and periphery regions.
The results indicate that for every de¯nition of neighbors, Italian re-
gions react to changes in the e®ective tax rate of neighboring regions. In
addition, strategic interaction between Italian regions over the local statu-
tory tax rate IRAP is examined. The IRAP is a local tax on value added
business activities which can be set more or less independently by the regions
since 2001. The results show that if a periphery region decreases its IRAP
tax rate, core regions will react by also decreasing their tax rate in order not
to widen the gap in tax rates too much and vice versa. To conclude, Italian
regions compete over ETR and IRAP to attract ¯rms to their jurisdiction.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview
of the Italian corporate tax system and reforms during the period 1993-2006.
The literature on ¯scal strategic interactions and how to measure e®ective
tax rates is summarized section 2.3. Section 2.4 reports the collection of the
data and the descriptive results. Section 2.5 shows the ¯rm level model and
results, while section 2.6 shows the strategic interaction model and results.
Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Italian Corporate Tax System
The Italian corporate tax system has known a considerable number of
reforms. Table 2.1 gives a summary of all tax rates and tax incentives for
the period 1993-2006. Before 1998, Italian companies were subject to the
corporate tax rates IRPEG ('imposta sul reddito delle persone giuridiche')
and ILOR ('imposta locale sul reddito'). IRPEG is the usual corporate
income tax. The tax base for IRPEG is the company's pro¯t adjusted
for depreciation allowances1, carry-forward losses2, interest payments and
dividends3. The °at tax rate ILOR of 16.2 percent is applied to pro¯ts with
no carried-forward losses and no dividends included in the tax base. These
two taxes lead to an overall statutory tax rate (STR) of 52.2% in 1993. On
top of this STR, Italian companies have to pay an additional tax of 0.75
percent on their net assets4. This extra tax was abolished in 1998.
The IRPEG rate changed in 1995, 2001, 2003 and 2004, but the largest
reform was in 1998 which was designed to achieve more neutrality in the
tax system. First, the ILOR tax was replaced by IRAP, a local tax on
added value generated by all business activities. Since 2001, the regions
are allowed to di®erentiate this IRAP upwards and downwards by up to 1
percent and di®erentiate between sectors and activities. Secondly, a dual
income tax system, DIT, was introduced. This system divides pro¯ts into
two components. The nominal pro¯ts, i.e. net equity formed by capital and
reserves, are taxed at a reduced rate of 19 percent. The extra-pro¯t is taxed
at the normal statutory rate, IRPEG. DIT was supposed to stimulate equity
1Firms are able to bene¯t from increased depreciation allowances for capital invest-
ments in the ¯rst 3 years of the investment.
2Losses can be carried-forward for up to 5 years.
3Before 1992, receiving dividends from resident companies are entitled to a tax credit
of 56.25 percent, while nonresident companies may not bene¯t this tax credit except for
the UK and France. Since 1992, a European directive allows dividends from an Italian
or a European associated company (engaged to hold at least 25 percent for more than
12 months) to be exempted from the taxable income for 95 percent. Since 2002, the 95
percent exemption is extended to non-EU companies resident in countries or territories
characterized by a level of taxation similar to that in Italy and with which Italy has a
system for exchange of information.
4Net worth is the value of total assets minus the value of total liabilities or in other
words the net assets.2.2. Italian Corporate Tax System
opposed to debt ¯nancing.
In order to attract new industrial enterprises to southern Italy and
certain depressed mountain regions in central and northern Italy5, capital
investments in these areas bene¯t from tax credits and more bene¯cial loans
until December 2006. Furthermore, in Southern Italy manufacturing com-
panies established between March 29, 1986 and December 31, 1993 do not
pay IRPEG taxes for 10 years since their incorporation and they do not pay
ILOR taxes for 10 years from the ¯rst year in which the company makes
pro¯t. In addition to these general tax incentives, the Tremonti tax credit
was introduced in 1994 to stimulate the economy. If a company invests
more than its average investment in the previous ¯ve years, a tax credit up
to 50 percent of the investment is granted. The Tremonti tax credit could
be carried forward up to 5 years. According to Bernasconi et al. (2005),
investment increased by 20 percent during the period 1994-1996 and to ful-
¯ll the condition of the credit, more than 60 percent of Italian companies
realized investments greater than their average of the previous 5 years. One
reason of the success is probably the short period during which the credits
were allowed. In 1999 the Visco investment credit for equity-¯nanced invest-
ment was introduced. This tax credit was allowed until 2002. During the
last two years, companies could choose between the Visco investment credit
or the new Tremonti tax credit6((Bernasconi et al. 2005), (Staderini 2001),
(pricewaterhousecoopers 2002)).
In 2005, the advocate general of the European court of justice concluded
that the IRAP is prohibited by the sixth VAT directive which prohibits
EU member states from introducing or maintaining VAT-like systems of
taxation not to interrupt the proper functioning of VAT. Since it can not
be expected that Italy would change its tax system of regional ¯nancing
overnight, it was suggested that the judgement will take e®ect at the end
of the tax period 2006. In order to meet the European rules, the 2004
reform of the Italian tax system decided to repeal IRAP over 3 years and
substitute by more expense deductions such as tax incentives for R&D costs
(pricewaterhousecoopers 2002).
5Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Abruzzo and Molise
6This new Tremonti tax credit is the same as the Tremonti law in 1994.
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Table 2.1: Summary Table, in percent
Year IRPEG ILOR DIT IRAP Tax on Tax incentives STR
net worth
1993 36 16.2 0.75 52.2
1994 36 16.2 0.75 Tremonti 52.2
1995 37 16.2 0.75 Tremonti 53.2
1996 37 16.2 0.75 Tremonti 53.2
1997 37 16.2 19 0.75 53.2
1998 37 19 4.25 41.25
1999 37 19 4.25 Visco & DIT 41.25
2000 37 19 4.25 Visco & DIT 41.25
2001 36 4:25a Visco & DIT or new Tremonti 40.25
2002 36 4:25a Visco & DIT or new Tremonti 40.25
2003 34 4:25a tax incentives for R&D costs 38.25
limitations on interest deduction
2004 33 4:25a tax incentives for R&D costs 37.25
limitations on interest deduction
2005 33 4:25a tax incentives for R&D costs 37.25
limitations on interest deduction
2006 33 4:25a tax incentives for R&D costs 37.25
limitations on interest deduction
note: a = regions can di®erentiate this rate upwards or down-
wards by up to 1 percentage and can di®erentiate the rate by cat-
egories of taxpayers, sector or activity (Bernasconi et al. 2005)2.3. Tax Competition Literature
To summarize, the main regional tax di®erences come from 2 legal tax
incentives. First, tax incentives are given to new investments and manufac-
turing companies in less developed regions of Italy. Second, the local IRAP
tax rate can directly be manipulated by the regions.
2.3 Tax Competition Literature
Fiscal interaction amongst governments is studied already a long time.
Fiscal interaction may occur as a result of bene¯t spillovers, where residents
consume the public goods provided by neighboring jurisdictions or it can
be a result of capital mobility. With capital mobility, tax rates in other
jurisdictions must be taken into account which leads to strategic behavior.
This strategic behavior is studied in the empirical literature as strategic
interaction models or ¯scal reaction functions7. This section ¯rst introduces
the classic strategic interaction model and second summarizes the empirical
literature on this matter.
2.3.1 Strategic interaction model
In a tax competition model, jurisdictions are a®ected by the amount
of a particular resource within their borders for example a mobile tax base
(Brueckner 2003). Brueckner (2003) summarizes the tax competition, resource-
°ow model as follows:
Assume that jurisdictions produce a private good using mobile capital
and immobile labor. In the model, f(ki) is the production function and ki
is the capital per worker in jurisdiction i. The capital per worker will act as
the resource variable. Furthermore, jurisdictions have identical population
sizes and tax locally employed capital at a rate ti. A public good is provided
and ¯nanced by tax revenue per worker, tiki. To equalize net-of-tax returns,
capital moves across jurisdictions so that
7The terms ¯scal reaction function, tax mimicking, spatial competition and strategic
interaction will be used as synonyms explaining the strategic behavior amongst regions as
a reaction to tax rate changes in related other regions
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f0(kj) ¡ tj = ½;j = 1;::::;n
X
j=1
kj = nk (2.1)
with ½ as the net return of capital and k the economy-wide level of




These equations indicate that capital will move to jurisdiction i if it
has the most bene¯cial tax rate, ti, compared to the tax rate in other juris-
dictions, t¡i. Moreover, net return of capital depends on all tax rates.
Finally, individual consumption, ci, is equal to the sum of the wage,
w(ki), and the income from ownership of capital under the assumption that
consumers own equal shares of the total, ½k. Using this information, the
preferences of the jurisdictions can be written as:
U(ci;qi; f Xi) = U[w(ki) + ½k;tiki; f Xi]
= U[w(H[ti;t¡i]) + G(t)k;tiH[ti;t¡i]; f Xi]
´ V (ti;t¡i; f Xi)
(2.3)
where f Xi are characteristics of jurisdiction i. Maximizing (2.3) by choice of
ti yields the ¯scal reaction function
ti = R(t¡i; f Xi) (2.4)
Equation (2.4) implies that in choosing ti, jurisdiction i will take into
account that an increase in the tax rate will cause capital °ees and lowers
capital's net return ½. Moreover, this impact will depend on the tax rates
in the other jurisdictions (Brueckner 2003). Summarized, a ¯scal reaction
function essentially measures whether a jurisdiction will change its tax rate
in response to changes in the tax rate of other jurisdictions. When tax rates
are chosen strategically, the reaction function has a nonzero slope.2.3. Tax Competition Literature
2.3.2 Empirical Literature on Strategic Interaction
Strategic interaction amongst regions within one country is mostly
studied for local property tax rates (for example Bordignon et al. (2002),
Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Brueckner (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000),
Brueckner & Saavedra (2001), Buettner (2001), Allers & Elhorst (2005)
and Oll¶ e (2003)) and expenditures (for example Revelli (2003), Case et al.
(1993), Geys (2006), Baicker (2005) and Werck et al. (2007)). Besley &
Case (1995) study local corporate taxes for US states during the period
1960-1988. They ¯nd that local tax-setting in the states is tied because of
yardstick competition. This means that voters use information from other
jurisdictions to judge the performance of their own politicians. Therefore,
rational politicians will mimic their neighbors' tax rates to secure their re-
election. Bordignon et al. (2002) show for Italian cities that mayors who ran
for reelection in 2000 mimicked property tax rates of adjacent cities8.
This chapter will extend this literature by studying strategic interaction
of corporate taxes amongst Italian regions using a panel of ten years.
2.3.3 E®ective Tax Rates
E®ective tax rates (ETR) can be computed in 3 various ways: macro-
backward looking, micro-backward looking and micro-forward looking method.
The main di®erences between these measures is the level of aggregation
(micro or macro data) and the type of information used (backward- or
forward-looking). The macro-backward looking method computes e®ective
tax rates on an aggregated country-level with data from national accounts.
This method de¯nes the ETR as the ratio of tax revenue to a country's
gross operating surplus (Gorter & de Mooij (2001), Mendoza et al. (1994),
Martinez-Mongay (1997), Volkerink & de Haan (2000) and Stewart & Webb
(2006)). Since the numerator includes pro¯ts from tax-exempted rents, roy-
alties and revenues from capital assets, this method usually understates the
real e®ective tax burden of a country. Secondly, it is not possible to analyze
¯rm- sector- or regional heterogeneity in ETRs (Nicodµ eme 2001).
8For an exhaustive overview of the empirical literature in strategic interaction studies
see Brueckner (2003).
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Micro-level ETRs di®er in the type of information used. Backward-
looking studies use real-life data from ¯nancial statements, while forward-
looking studies use information of the legal tax system. Therefore forward-
looking studies are considered for investigating a hypothetical investment de-
cision given a particular tax structure and ¯nancial assumptions (Devereux
et al. 2002). The drawback of this theoretical measure is that it does not
take into account the complexity and the interaction of all elements of the
tax system such as carry-forwards and tax incentives. As a consequence
the micro-backward looking method is more suited for the type of research
question analyzed in this chapter. This method computes the ETR using
two elements from the company's pro¯t and loss account.
ETRit = corporate taxes paidit=profit before taxit
corporate taxes paidit = STRit ¤ tax baseit
(2.5)
where i is a particular ¯rm in year t. Since the numerator is based on the
tax base and the denominator is the gross pro¯t before tax, this measure
captures the e®ective tax burden of a ¯rm. The di®erence between a ¯rm's
ETR and the overall STR re°ects the amount of tax incentives for the ¯rm
9.
Since the IRAP, one of the tax rate part of the overall corporate tax
rate, is applied to the value added of business activities instead of pro¯ts, a
second ETR measure is considered.
ETR2it = corporate taxesit=value addedit (2.6)
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data Selection
The research question in this chapter is twofold. Therefore, two di®er-
ent datasets are collected. First, to investigate whether there exist regional
di®erences in the ETRs of Italian ¯rms, data from ¯nancial statements is
collected from Dijck (2005). The database Dijck (2005) includes ¯nancial
9A complete discussion of ETR measures is described in Devereux et al. (2002) and
Nicodµ eme (2001).2.4. Data
statements of 5.5 million ¯rms from 38 European countries. Firms are se-
lected amongst the 250 000 largest Italian ¯rms in Dijck (2005)10. Only non-
¯nancial ¯rms were selected, since ¯nancial ¯rms apply di®erent accounting
standards and only data from unconsolidated active11 companies is collected
for the period 1993-2003. This selection process sets up a dataset of 14 938
¯rms. Finally, extreme observations with ETR < 0 and ETR > 1 were
excluded (Collins & Shackelford (2003) and Vandenbussche et al. (2005)).
A second step analyzes whether these regional di®erences are a result of
strategic behavior of the regions. Therefore a second dataset is constructed.
This dataset consists of the average e®ective tax rate for every region, re-
gional population and GDP data from the national institute of statistics,
which were available for 1990-2006. The individual IRAP tax rates were
available for every region from the Italian ministry of ¯nance for the period
2002-2006.
2.4.2 Descriptive Results
The characteristics of the two datasets are summarized in Table 2.2.
The table shows that the average Italian ETR for the period 1993-2003 is
47.8%. The ¯rms are on average 28 years old an only a few observations
are quoted on the stock market. The average number of employees and
pro¯t before tax of the ¯rms indicate that the sample exists of very large
¯rms. Furthermore, 27% of the ¯rms are owned by foreign shareholders12
and 4.24% of the ¯rms holds at least 50% of the shares of a foreign company.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of the average ETR over the period
1993-2003. The average ETR for large Italian ¯rms strongly increases from
1995 onwards until 1998. After the tax reform of 1998 the ETR decreases,
but stays around 50%. The average ETR of 2003 increases again above
50%. The increasing trend during the early '90s in e®ective tax rates is a
common trend in the European Union. European countries carried through
10The selection criteria in Amadeus for the top 250 000 companies in Italy are: operating
revenue > 15 million euro, total assets > 30 million euro or number of employees > 150
11The ¯rms with bankruptcy, dissolved, in liquidation and inactive legal status were
dropped from the sample.
12Firms are foreign owned when more than 50% of their shares are in hands of foreign
owners and foreign subsidiaries are for more than 50% of Italian ¯rms.
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Number of quoted ¯rms (%) 0.14
Pro¯t before tax (th. euro) 1844.548
(46903.16)
Foreign owned observations (%) 27.46




Regional GDP (in millions) 54 426.8
(52265.25)
Regional labor force (15·age·65) 1 967 081
(1 579 638)
source: Amadeus database and national institute for statistics; note: standard devi-
ations between brackets2.4. Data
a combination of decreasing statutory tax rates and increasing tax rates in
order to minimize the e®ect of a lower statutory tax rate for the tax revenues
(Devereux et al. (2002) and Vandenbussche & Crabb¶ e (2006)).
Figure 2.1: Average ETR in Italy over time
Figure 2.1 shows the average ETR per region. The ¯gure indicates that
the di®erence in ETR between the region with the highest average ETR
(Marche, 50.5%) and the lowest average ETR (Basilicata, 32.2%) is equal
to 18.3% and so substantial. Not surprising, the 10 southern and mountain
area regions have the lowest average ETR, while the 10 central and northern
regions have the highest average ETR. As a consequence a core-periphery
structure is already re°ected in the descriptive statistics. The average ETR
of Umbria is almost equal to the overall average of 47.8% and will therefore
be used as the reference region in section 2.5. The average e®ective tax rate
of the core and the periphery are illustrated in Figure 2.3. Over time, the
gap between the core and periphery decreased from 11% in 1993 to 5% in
2003.
Finally, Figure 2.4 presents the percentage of foreign owned ¯rms per
region. It is clear from this table that more foreign owned ¯rms are located
in the North and center of Italy (core area).
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Figure 2.2: Average ETR per Italian region, 1993-2003
Figure 2.3: Average ETR in Italian core and periphery regions, 1993-20032.5. Di®erences in ETR across Firms
Figure 2.4: Share of foreign owned ¯rms per Italian region
2.5 Di®erences in ETR across Firms
2.5.1 Model
First, the determinants of the e®ective tax rate of Italian ¯rms will be
identi¯ed using the following estimation model:
ETRit = ¯0 + ¯1firm sizeit + ¯2capital intensityit (2.7)
+¯3R&D intensityit + ¯4LT leverageit + ¯5regioni
+¯6sectori + ±t + "it
where the dependent variable, ETR, is the e®ective tax rate of ¯rm i
in year t and ±t are time dummies.
The speci¯cation of the model closely follows the literature by including
variables that control for legal tax incentives (capital and R&D intensity,
LT leverage, foreign ownership), other ¯rm characteristics (¯rm size), time
dummies, sector dummies and regional dummies (Buijinck et al. (2002), Bui-
jinck et al. (2000), Nicodµ eme (2002), Huizinga & Nicodµ eme (2006), Gupta
& Newberry (1997), Collins & Shackelford (2003), Janssen (2005), Vanden-
bussche et al. (2005) and Vandenbussche & Tan (2005)). The de¯nitions of
the variables are described in Table 2.10 in Appendix.
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The model includes ¯rm size measured by number of employees or total
assets. The literature is not clear on the relationship between ¯rm size and
ETR. On the one hand, the 'political cost theory' argues that large ¯rms
have a higher visibility, which means they picked out more for control. As
a result larger ¯rms face higher ETRs. On the other hand, 'the political
power theory' argues that larger ¯rms have greater resources to in°uence
the political process and therefore are expected to face lower ETRs (Gupta
& Newberry 1997). Nicodµ eme (2002), using sales as a size variable, derived a
theoretical, positive relationship between a ¯rm's sales and its tax liability,
suggesting that larger ¯rms would pay more taxes. However, empirically
he found a negative relationship between size variables and tax liabilities,
suggesting that larger ¯rms pay lower taxes. The other ¯rm-level variables
in the model as capital intensity, R&D intensity, LT leverage and foreign
ownership are included to control for the legal tax credits for investments,
dividends and interests. As a consequence, these variables are expected to
lower the ETR of the ¯rm. Finally, the model includes dummy variables to
control for time, sector and region. The year 1993, the sector agriculture,
hunting and related service activities13 and Umbria region14 respectively are
taken as a benchmark. The correlation between all variables is summarized
in Table 2.3.
2.5.2 Results
The results are reported in Table 2.4. Regression (2) adds a dummy
variable for foreign ownership and foreign subsidiaries, while regression (3)
includes a dummy for carry forwards of losses. The regression in column (4)
includes a variable for ¯rm age.
The results indicate that the regions Basilicata, Campania, Sicilia, Valle
D'Aosta, Sardegna, Abruzzo, Puglia, Calabria and Lazio have a signi¯cant
lower ETR than the average ETR in all speci¯cations in Table 2.4. These
regions are southern regions or regions in mountain areas with low pop-
13This sector is randomly chosen as the reference sector by the statistical program
STATA since regional di®erences are the focus of this chapter.
14The average ETR of Umbria over the whole period is 0.473 which is closest to the
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Table 2.4: Basic regression
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Basic) (Foreign own.) (Carry forwards) (Firm age)
Log(employment) 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.0144*** .011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (.001)
LT leverage 0.327*** 0.335*** 0.245*** .324***
(0.056) (0.05) (0.052) (.056)
Capital intensity -0.186*** -0.19*** -0.128*** -.188***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (.010)
R&D intensity -0.338*** -0.332*** -0.126*** -.3687***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (.031)
Firm age - - - .0003***
(.0001)
Foreign ownership - -0.048*** - -
(0.006)
Foreign subsidiaries - -0.023*** - -
(0.007)
Carry forward - -0.24*** -
(0.005)
Sicilia -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -.053***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.015) (.017)
Piemonte 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 .007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (.013)
Marche 0.01 -0.01 -0.005 .009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (.015)
Valle D'Aosta -0.122*** -0.113*** -0.068 -.138***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.044) (.051)
Toscana 0.01 -0.01 0.003 .008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (.014)
Campania -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -.051***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (.014)
Puglia -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.043 -.036**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (.018)2.5. Di®erences in ETR across Firms
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4)
Veneto 0.014 -0.014 0.006 .014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (.013)
Lombardia -0.0003 -0.002 -0.001 .002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (.012)
Emilia-Romagna -0.006 -0.005 -0.01 -.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (.013)
Trenito-Alto Adige -0.024* -0.023 -0.039** -.026*
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (.015)
Sardegna -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.054 -.043**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.037) (.021)
Molise -0.072* 0.071* -0.031 -.091**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.022) (.042)
Calabria -0.047** -0.048** -0.103 -.038
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (.025)
Abruzzo -0.101*** -0.1*** -0.103*** -.101***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (.019)
Lazio -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.028** -.036***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (.014)
Friuli-Venezia Giuli 0.003 0.004 -0.005 .003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (.015)
Liguria -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (.017)
Basilicata -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.153*** -.166***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (.025)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
constant 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.29*** .243***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (.026)
Observations 72 528 72 535 60 836 67 112
R2 0.135 0.137 0.189 0.139
note: Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All regressions are
clustered for ¯rm observations. Regression (2) controls for foreign ownership and
foreign subsidiaries, while regression (3) controls for carried forward losses in the tax
base. The age of the ¯rms is added as a control variable in regression (4). ***, **
and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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ulation densities and employment. Therefore these regions are identi¯ed
as the more peripheral regions of Italy. This implies that the geographical
core-periphery situation of Italy is re°ected in the ETRs of the ¯rms as Van-
denbussche et al. (2005) also found for Belgium. Furthermore, larger ¯rms in
terms of employment and ¯rms with relatively more long-term leverage have
a higher ETR. While ¯rms with relatively more capital and R&D intensity
have a lower tax burden as predicted by the legal tax incentives. Foreign
¯rms or ¯rms with foreign subsidiaries bene¯t from sigini¯cant lower taxes
as in Huizinga & Nicodµ eme (2006) and Vandenbussche & Tan (2005), while
the other results stay robust. Regression (3) con¯rms that carry forward
losses lowers the ETR of a ¯rm, but including this variable does not change
the previous results. Surprising is that the coe±cient of ¯rm age in column
(4) is small but positive and very signi¯cant, indicating that older ¯rms pay
more taxes, although there exist tax incentives for older ¯rms in Italy.
Table 2.5 shows some robustness checks for these results. First, the
ambiguous sign for ¯rm size in the literature is tested. In column (1), the
logarithm of employment is substituted by the logarithm of total assets. The
estimation indicates that large ¯rms in terms of total assets have a lower
ETR which is opposite to the result of employment. A possible explanation
is that total assets also include investments which bene¯t from tax credits.
Second, regression (2) shows that ¯rms with not only relatively more long-
term but also short-term leverage have a higher ETR. A possible reason for
this could be that in Italy more pro¯table ¯rms have easier access to loans.
In regression (3) a control variable ROA, lagged by 1 period, is included
to control for the pro¯tability of the ¯rm. This variable is positive and
signi¯cant, but does not change any other result. Regression (4) uses the
original dataset and excludes extreme values larger or smaller than 2 times
the standard deviation from the mean value of ETR. Using this dataset, the
signi¯cance of the variable leverage and of some regional variables are re-
duced. Finally, the alternative ETR measure is used as a dependent variable
in column (5)15. In this estimation, only Umbria, Valle D'Aosta, Sardenga,
Molise, Abruzzo and Calabria have a signi¯cant lower ETR. These are still
15Since the average ETR2 of Lazio is closest to the overall average of ETR2, this region
will be used as the reference region instead of Umbria2.6. Strategic Interaction amongst Italian Regions
southern and mountain area regions.
Although these estimations show that there exist di®erences in ETRs
across Italian regions, it is not clear whether these di®erences are due to
the diversity in tax rules, the variety in levels of enforcement, the existence
of special tax regimes or strategic interaction between regions. Therefore a
¯scal reaction function is estimated in section 2.6.
2.6 Strategic Interaction amongst Italian Regions
2.6.1 Model
To test strategic interaction amongst Italian regions, a ¯scal reaction
function is built as in Brueckner (2003).
ETRit = ®i + ±t + ¯0 + ¯1ETRit¡1 + ¯2(wETR)it + ¯3Xit + "it (2.8)
where ETRit is the average ETR of region i in year t, ®i is a region-
speci¯c e®ect, ±t is a time e®ect and X is a set of regional control vari-
ables such as GDP and population. The variable of interest wETRit is the










where ETRjt is the e®ective tax rate of the other regions in the sam-
ple and wij is the spatial weight. The most intuitive criterion for selecting
neighbors is based upon geographical proximity. In its simplest form, it im-
plies that two regions are considered neighbors if they share a border. Such
a criterion is justi¯ed for two reasons. First, geographic neighbors are likely
to experience similar cost shocks, so neighbors' tax rates are more informa-
tive than tax rates in far away regions. Second, information about nearby
regions is likely to spread quite easily (Besley & Case 1995). These '¯rst-
order-neighbors' imply that wij is equal to 1 if region j has a common land
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Table 2.5: Robustness Checks
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm size Leverage ROA Filter Dep. var.= etr2
Log(employment) - 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.013*** -0.01***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Log(total assets) -0.007*** - - - -
(0.001)
LT leverage 0.377*** 0.33*** 0.337*** 0.174 0.04*
(0.054) (0.056) (0.051) (0.234) (0.009)
ST leverage - 0.098*** - - -
(0.009)
Capital intensity -0.159*** -0.186*** -0.161*** -0.29*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.035) (0.01)
R&D intensity -0.344*** -0.333*** -0.252*** -0.564*** -0.21***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.03) (0.095) (0.03)
ROAt¡1 - - 0.001*** - -
(0.0002)
Foreign ownership - - - - 0.02**
(0.01)
Foreign subsidiaries - - - - 0.004
(0.004)
Sicilia -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.085 -0.006
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.065) (0.01)
Piemonte 0.011 0.006 9.88e-06 -0.021 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.053) (0.01)
Marche 0.011 0.01 -0.001 -0.012 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.061) (0.01)
Umbria - - - - -0.01*
(0.01)
Valle D'Aosta -0.103* -0.119** -0.121*** -0.224** -0.03**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.057) (0.109) (0.01)
Toscana 0.008 0.006 0.005 -0.059 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.054) (0.01)2.6. Strategic Interaction amongst Italian Regions
Table 2.5
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Campania -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.042 -0.02
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.057) (0.01)
Puglia -0.05*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.132** -0.01
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.062) (0.01)
Veneto 0.014 0.012 0.009 -0.008 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.052) (0.01)
Lombardia 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.059 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.05) (0.01)
Emilia-Romagna -0.004 -0.007 -0.01 -0.037 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.051) (0.01)
Trenito-Alto Adige -0.022 -0.024* -0.036*** -0.119** 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.058) (0.01)
Sardegna -0.062*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.045 -0.02*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.021) (0.077) (0.01)
Molise -0.077* -0.074* -0.069* -0.296** -0.03***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.101) (0.01)
Calabria -0.051*** -0.049** -0.041* -0.057 -0.03***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.094) (0.01)
Abruzzo -0.1*** -0.102*** -0.106*** -0.117* -0.02**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.065) (0.01)
Lazio -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.051 -
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.054)
Friuli-Venezia Giuli 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.056 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.061) (0.01)
Liguria -0.014 -0.018 -0.02 -0.126** 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.063) (0.01)
Basilicata -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.154* -0.02
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.089) (0.02)
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Table 2.5
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
constant 0.237*** 0.225 0.218*** 0.386*** -0.1***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.092) (0.01)
Observations 72 528 75 528 59 731 94 422 70 268
R2 0.135 0.138 0.124 0.006 0.25
note: Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All regressions are
clustered for ¯rm observations and include time and sector dummies. Regression (1)
uses a di®erent measure of ¯rm size, logarithm of total assets. Regression (2) includes
short-term leverage, while (3) also controls for return on assets. Regression (4) ¯lters
the extreme values from the original dataset as 2 times the standard deviation from
the mean. The dependent variable in (5) is the alternative etr measure (taxes/value
added). ***, ** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and
10 percent levels.
or water border with region i (contiguity) and 0 otherwise16 A signi¯cant
coe±cient for this spatial variable, wETRit, is evidence of strategic inter-
action in ETRs between Italian neighboring regions. While this approach
seems naturally for large US states, Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998) argument
that for smaller European regions a region's reference space may extend be-
yond its immediate neighbors. Therefore, second-order-neighbors are taken
into account as well. This means that wij is equal to 1 if region j is a sec-
ond neighbor of region i and 0 otherwise. In stead of measuring neighbors
as a dummy variable, a third spatial weight will be de¯ned as the inverse
distance between the capital cities of the regions. Finally, spatial weights
that re°ect the core-periphery structure of Italy will be used. This implies
that wij is equal to 1 if region j is a core region and region i is a periphery
region and vice versa.
In the literature two econometric issues for this spatial regression are
identi¯ed. First, the region speci¯c e®ects in regression (2.8) can be corre-
16The neighbor of Island Sicilia is Calibria and for Sardegna the neighbors are Campania,
Lazio, Liguria, Sicilia, Toscana and basilicata.2.6. Strategic Interaction amongst Italian Regions
lated with the lagged dependent variable. Therefore regression (2.8) will be
estimated in ¯rst di®erences to get rid of the region speci¯c e®ects17. Second,
since tax competition models predict that tax rates are jointly determined
(Brueckner 1998)18, the variable wETRit can be endogenous and correlated
with the error term. A possible estimation method to solve these 2 issues
is an instrumental variable regression (Brett & Pinkse (2000), Heyndels &
Vuchelen (1998), Figlio et al. (1999), Oll¶ e (2003) and Geys (2006)).In a ¯rst
stage regression the instrumented variable is derived from regressing each




i6=j wijXi6=j and Xi. The
¯tted values, \ P
i6=j wijETRjt are then used as instruments for the weighted
tax rates in equation (2.8). This 2SLS method is used very often in strategic
interaction models (Brueckner (2003), Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Re-
doano (2003), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Carlsen
et al. (2005), Oll¶ e (2003), Figlio et al. (1999), Revelli (2002), Ladd (1992),
Buettner (2003), Geys (2006), Baicker (2005), Werck et al. (2007) and Allers
& Elhorst (2005)).
2.6.2 ETR Results
Table 2.6 reports the results of regression (2.8) in ¯rst di®erences with
di®erent spatial weights. The ¯rst column uses the ¯rst-order-neighbors,
while column (2) includes the second-order-neighbors as well. Regression (3)
weights the e®ective tax rate of the other regions with the inverse distance
between the capital cities. Column (4) indicates whether the ¯rm belongs
to the core or periphery group.
The OLS estimates show a positive and signi¯cant slope of the ¯scal
reaction function for all spatial weights. These results indicate that Ital-
ian regions signi¯cantly react to changes in the tax burden of neighboring
regions. Moreover, taking the coe±cient of the ¯rst-order-neighbors, this
means that a 10% decrease in the e®ective tax rate of the neighbors, leads
to a 95% decrease on average in the e®ective tax rate of region i. The slope
17Time dummies are also not included anymore, since the variables are in ¯rst di®erences
and the regressions already control for GDP °uctuations.
18By setting its tax rate, a country or region will take into account the tax rate of other
countries or regions.
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Table 2.6: Fiscal reaction function OLS results
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4)
FON SON dist. core-periph.
ETRi;t¡1 0.07 0.1** 0.08* 0.11*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
(wETR)i;t 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.95*** 0.88***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Population (15-65) -2.53E-09 -2.41E-09 -4.49E-09*** -2.32E-09
(4.96E-09) (5.07E-09) (5.00E-09) (6.17E-09)
GDP -1.13E-06*** -1.13E-06*** -1.61E-06*** -1.24E-06
(7.22E-07) (7.38E-07) (7.22E-07) (8.97E-07)
constant 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 180 180 180 180
¯rst order ser. corr. test 0.01 0.006 0.00 0.00
second order ser. corr. test 0.3 0.47 0.7 0.11
note: All regressions are estimated in ¯rst di®erences. Regression (1) uses the ETR
of other countries weighted with the ¯rst-order-neighbors (FON), while (2) uses the
second-order-neighbors (SON) as well. In regression (5) wij = 1/distance between
the capital cities of the regions. Regression (6) includes wcore¡peripheryETRi;t¡2 as
a spatial variable where wij = 1 if region j is a member of the core while region i is
a periphery-region and vice versa. ***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates
at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.2.6. Strategic Interaction amongst Italian Regions
of the reaction function using core-periphery weights is also positive and
signi¯cant. According to the theory of Baldwin & Krugman (2004), ¯rms
are willing to pay a higher tax to stay in core-regions in return for the bet-
ter developed infrastructure, labor market and industry in general in these
regions. The periphery-regions can use tax rates as an instrument to attract
¯rms by setting a lower tax. Therefore it is in the interest of both regions
to sustain this gap in the tax rate. When periphery-regions lower their tax
rate, core-regions will also lower their tax rate to prevent capital out°ow.
When the core sets a lower tax rate, periphery-regions will also decrease
the tax rate to maintain their tax bene¯t. Furthermore, regional ETRs also
depend on the ETR of the previous period and GDP. The estimates indicate
that regions with a higher GDP have a lower e®ective tax rate. This is not
in line with tax competition theory which claims that larger countries have a
higher tax rate because the erosion of their tax base is smaller in per capita
terms (Wilson 1999). The coe±cient in the table is very small and therefore
negligible.
To deal with the possible endogeneity of the spatial variable, this vari-
able is instrumented in the following Table 2.7. In addition, the lagged
dependent variable is instrumented by more lags. Table 2.7 shows that re-
sults are similar as the OLS estimation. Italian regions react to changes
in the tax rate of neighboring regions. The result of core and periphery
regions is not robust, indicating that core regions do not react signi¯cantly
to e®ective tax rates in the periphery regions and vice versa.
2.6.3 IRAP Results
The IRAP tax rate is a local tax on the value added of business activ-
ities. Since 2001, Italian regions can change independently the rate of this
tax up to 1% and set a di®erent rate according to the sector or ¯rm. The
regional IRAP rates for the period 2002-2005 will be used in the strategic
interaction model of section 2.6.1 to test whether Italian regions use this tax
rate for capital tax competition. In column (1) the IRAP tax rates of the
other regions is weighted with a dummy based on the ¯rst-order-neighbors,
while in column (2) the spatial weight equals 1 if region j is a member of
the core while region i is a periphery-region and vice versa. For both spatial
60CHAPTER 2. TAX COMPETITION IN ITALY
Table 2.7: Fiscal reaction function results, IV
dep. var. = ETR (1) (2) (3) (4)
FON SON distance core-periph.
ETRi;t¡1 -0.03 -0.34 -0.12 0.52*
(0.28) (0.24) (0.16) (0.29)
(wETR)i;t 1.32**** 1.44*** 1.33*** 1.13
(0.41) (0.47) (0.34) (0.79)
Population (15-65) 7.51E-07 6.98E-07 6.92E-08 -2.13E-06
(8.91E-07) (8.95E-07) (7.18E-07) (1.31E-06)
GDP -4.34E-12 -6.92E-12 -2.19E-12 9.95E-12*
(4.55E-12) (4.49E-12) (3.40E-12) (5.73E-12)
constant -0.006 0.006* -0.006* -0.04
(0.02) (0.003) (0.02) (0.04)
Observations 100 100 100 100
Sargan test 0.69 0.64 0.44 0.52
note: All regressions are estimated in ¯rst di®erences, the spatial variable and the
dependent variable are instrumented in a ¯rst stage regression, not reported here.
Regression (1) uses the ETR of other countries weighted with the ¯rst-order-neighbors
(FON), while (2) uses the second-order-neighbors (SON) as well. In regression (5)
wij = 1/distance between the capital cities of the regions. Regression (6) includes
wcore¡peripheryETRi;t¡2 as a spatial variable where wij = 1 if region j is a member
of the core while region i is a periphery-region and vice versa. ***,** and * denote
signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.2.6. Strategic Interaction amongst Italian Regions
weights, equation (2.8) is estimated in ¯rst di®erences with IV. The results
from Table 2.8 show only signi¯cant results for the core-periphery structure.
The coe±cient is positive, indicating that core regions will adjust their IRAP
tax rate in response to IRAP tax changes in the periphery regions.
Table 2.8: Fiscal reaction function with IRAP-rates













Sargan test 0.60 /
note: All regressions are in ¯rst di®erences. The dependent variable are the local tax
rates, IRAP. Regressions (1) uses the ¯rst-order-neighbors and regression (2) uses a
spatial variable where wij = 1 if region j is a member of the core while region i is a
periphery-region and vice versa. ***, ** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates
at respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter studied regional di®erences in the e®ective tax rate (ETR)
in Italy. Tax incentives to some types of companies, special tax regimes and
the variety in levels of enforcement can result in di®erences in the e®ective
tax rate amongst companies. Taking into account ¯rm and sector char-
acteristics, results show that companies in southern and mountain regions
Basilicata, Campania, Sicilia, Sardegna, Abruzzo, Lazio and Valle D'Aosta
have a signi¯cant lower e®ective tax rate than the overall average e®ective
tax rate of 47.8 percent. These regions are also called the peripheral re-
gions of Italy. But the question remains whether the regional di®erences in
e®ective tax rates across Italian regions exist because of strategic interac-
tion between the regions. For di®erent de¯nitions of neighbors, this chapter
¯nds evidence of strategic interaction in e®ective tax rates between Italian
regions. This indicates that a region will react to changes in the e®ective
tax rate of neighboring regions. Moreover, the results show that the core
(north and central regions19) and periphery (Southern regions20) strategi-
cally interact as well. If a periphery region decreases its IRAP tax rate, core
regions will react by also decreasing their tax rate in order not to widen the
gap in tax rates too much and vice versa.
19Piedmonte, Lombardia, Trenito Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Grulia, Veneto, Liguria
Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche and Molise
20Basilicata, Campania, Sicilia, Sardegna, Abruzzo, Lazio, Puglia, Calabria and Valle
D'Aosta2.8. Appendix
2.8 Appendix
Figure 2.5: Regional map of Italy
64CHAPTER 2. TAX COMPETITION IN ITALY
Table 2.9: Ranking ETR by sector, average 1993-2003
NACE Description sector Average ETR
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities;
activities of travel agencies 0.517
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 0.516
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade,
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.511
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;
retail sale of automotive fuel 0.510
80 Education 0.509
75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 0.506
72 Computer and related activities 0.502
85 Health and social work 0.493
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.493
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork,
except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 0.491
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.489
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0,489
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0,488
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 0,487
except machinery and equipment
74 Computer and related activities 0.487
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks 0.481
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.479
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles;
repair of personal and household goods 0.476
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.471
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.466
23 Manufacture of coke, re¯ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.465
14 Other mining and quarrying 0.463
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.4622.8. Appendix
Table 2.9:Ranking ETR by sector, average 1993-2003, continued
NACE Description sector Average ETR
45 Construction 0.461
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.459
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.457
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.455
21 Manufacture of pulp, chapter and chapter products 0.453
32 Manufacture of radio, television
and communication equipment and apparatus 0.450
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.448
41 Collection, puri¯cation and distribution of water 0.448
37 Recycling 0.440
27 Manufacture of basic metals 0.438
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.433
30 Manufacture of o±ce machinery and computers 0.426
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.419
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and
of personal and household goods 0.417
73 Research and development 0.408
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.406
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 0.398
93 Other service activities 0.398
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 0.372
62 Air transport 0.352
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 0.352
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.346
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 0.345
70 Real estate activities 0.338
61 Water transport 0.302
64 Post and telecommunications 0.301
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Table 2.9:Ranking ETR by sector, average 1993-2003, continued
NACE Description sector Average ETR
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.300
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas;
service activities incidental
to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying 0.256
13 Mining of metal ores 0.224
5 Fishing, operation of ¯sh hatcheries and ¯sh farms;
service activities incidental to ¯shing 0.218
10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 0.000
Table 2.10: Data-appendix
Variables De¯nition
ETR = corporate taxes paid/pro¯t before tax
Firm size = log(number of employees) or log(total assets)
Capital intensity = Tangible ¯xed assets/total assets
R&D intensity = Intangible ¯xed assets/total assets
LT leverage = long-term debt/total assets
ST leverage = short-term debt/total assets
carry forward a dummy variable = 1 if the ¯rm made a loss in the previous period
Foreign ownership a dummy variable = 1 if the shares of a ¯rm are for at least for 50%
in hands of a foreign shareholder, 0 otherwise
Foreign subsidiaries a dummy variable = 1 if the ¯rm i directly owns at least 50%
of the shares of a foreign ¯rm, 0 otherwise
Firm age 2006 - startup year of the ¯rm
ETR 2 = corporate taxes paid/total assets
ROA = return on assets = pro¯t/total assets
Year Dummy variables for each year from 1994 and 2003, 1993 = reference
Sector Dummy variables for all 2-digit NACE industries, Nace 1 = reference
Regional Dummy variables for 19 regions, Umbria= reference
total assets= tangible ¯xed assets + intangible ¯xed assets + current assetsChapter 3
Spatial Tax Competition in
the EU15
3.1 Introduction
Decreasing tax rates is especially a European issue. Corporate taxes
dropped the past 10 years by 12 percentage points in the EU versus only 6
percentage points in non-EU OECD countries. Another European trend is
the compensation of declining tax rates with increasing taxable income. As
a result several studies conclude that tax competition in o±cial tax rates
is present, but not in terms of e®ective tax rates (Devereux et al. (2002)
and Vandenbussche & Crabb¶ e (2006)). This chapter analyzes strategic tax
setting in the 'old' EU14 as a reaction to the tax rates in the new member
states. Prior research has shown that FDI is sensitive to tax rates (Mooij
& Ederveen 2003). Also for Eastern European countries the corporate tax
rate is an e®ective instrument to attract FDI (Disdier & Mayer (2004) and
Bellak & Leibrecht (2005)). According to Devereux & Gri±th (1998) the
e®ective average tax rate plays a role for US multinationals in entering the
European market, but they did not compare with o±cial tax rates. In
contrast, Buettner & Ruf (2005) show that German multinationals take
into account the o±cial tax rate, rather than the e®ective tax rate in their
location decisions. Therefore, this chapter will focus on statutory tax rates,
0This chapter is based on co-authored work with H. Vandenbussche
693.1. Introduction
rather than e®ective tax rates in the EU25.
Especially since the entry of the new member States, European tax
competition has become ¯erce. Some earlier studies ¯nd that European
countries set their corporate tax rates interdependent (Devereux et al. (2008),
Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Redoano (2003) and Ruiz & Gerard (2007)),
but none of these studies investigated spatial tax competition between the
'old' EU14 and the new member states. This is where the aim of this chap-
ter lies: we study to what extent geographical proximity to low tax areas
like the new member states, a®ects corporate tax rates in the former EU14
countries1. We expect that tax competition will not be equally ¯erce be-
tween all countries. Some countries will ¯nd decreasing corporate tax rates
a priority, while others focus on other economic issues. The question then
raises whether the geographical position of European countries vis- µ a-vis the
new member states (low tax countries) in°uences the intensity of tax com-
petition. Does the former EU14 anxiously look at tax reforms in the new,
low tax, member states and adjust their taxes accordingly?
For this purpose, we ¯rst develop a spatial tax competition model with
countries competing to attract a multinational. The model predicts that tax
competition is more intense between geographically close countries. Second,
the outcome of the theoretical model is tested using a ¯scal reaction func-
tion.We test whether and which EU14 countries respond to changes in the
tax rates of the new EU member states. The results indicate that distance
to these new members matters for tax competition i.e. EU14 countries closer
to the EU10 like Germany and Austria are more responsive than countries
further away from the EU10 such as France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, section 3.2 shows some
stylized facts of corporate taxes in Europe. Section 3.3 reviews the related
literature on tax mimicking and section 3.4 develops a theoretical framework.
Section 4.4 explains the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4.6
shows the results and 4.7 discusses the robustness checks. Finally, section
4.9 brie°y concludes our main results.
1The EU14 includes Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, UK, France and Greece.
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3.2 Corporate taxes in Europe: stylized facts
Falling corporate tax rates is especially an European issue. Figure 3.1
illustrates the evolution of corporate tax rates in OECD62 and EU countries.
We observe that the tax rate in the OECD (-3%) remained more stable in
comparison to the sharp decrease in tax rates of the EU25 (-10%). Within
Europe, both the older EU15 countries and the 10 new member states have
known a decrease of 10% in their corporate tax rates. The ¯gure also shows
that during the whole period, corporate tax rates in the EU15 have been
higher than in the new member states.
Figure 3.1: Evolution tax rates in OECD and EU, 1995-2006
Source: European Commission
Although traditional tax competition theories predict a downward pres-
sure on corporate taxes when capital mobility increases (for an overview see
Wilson (1999) and Bretschger & Hettich (2002)), empirical studies do not
¯nd evidence of a race to the bottom in corporate taxes (Krogstrup (2004),
2OECD6= Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and USA3.2. Corporate taxes in Europe: stylized facts
Baldwin & Krugman (2004), Salvatore (2002), B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e et al. (2007),
Desai (1999), Mendoza & Tesar (2004) and Stewart & Webb (2006)). While
statutory taxes decreased in the EU, tax bases were broadened such that
tax revenues on corporate incomes remained stable (Devereux et al. (2002),
Buijinck et al. (2002) and Vandenbussche & Crabb¶ e (2006)). Figure 4.3
reports the evolution of the average e®ective tax rate of the EU15 countries
and the 10 new member states (EU10). In contrast to the nominal tax rate,
the aggregate e®ective tax rate remained quite stable and even increased in
the period 1993-2003.
Figure 3.2: Evolution E®ective Tax Rates (ETR) in Europe
Source: Amadeus data
Moreover, a study by Buettner & Ruf (2005) shows that German multi-
nationals take into account the statutory tax rate, rather than the e®ective
tax rate in their location decisions. Therefore, we will measure taxes by the
nominal tax rate instead of the e®ective tax rate.
We start by some stylized facts, Figure 3.3 splits up the EU15 countries
into neighbors of the new member states and non-neighbors of the new
member states. Neighbors are de¯ned as countries with a common land
or water border with one or more new EU members, for example Austria
and Italy are neighbors of Slovenia. The average nominal tax rate of the
new member states and Ireland are presented separately. Figure 3 not only
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illustrates that the older EU15 countries have a higher tax rate than the new
member states, but also that neighbors compared to non-neighbors of the
new member states have a much larger absolute decrease in their average
corporate tax rate (12% versus 6%). While the average tax rate in the
non-neighbors remained stable for a long period, the average tax rate in
the neighbors decreased rapidly and dived under the average tax rate of the
non-neighbors in 2000. These reforms could indicate that neighbors of the
new member states are subject to more intense tax competition as a result
of their geographical proximity to the Eastern low tax areas.
Figure 3.3: Tax Rate of the neighbors versus non-neighbors of the new member
states
Neighbors: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Greece;
Non-neighbors: Spain, France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal
The STR is not weighed. Source: Vandenbussche & Crabb¶ e (2006), extra data included
for 2005 and 2006.
To gain more insight in the declining corporate tax rates of the neigh-
bors and non-neighbors of the new member states, Figure 3.4 illustrates the
corporate tax rates for the individual countries. This ¯gure indicates that
neighbors of the NMS not only have the largest decrease in corporate tax
rates, but also started decreasing much faster. Almost all neighboring coun-
tries started their decrease in corporate taxes around 1992-1993, while the3.3. Related Literature on Fiscal Reaction Functions
decrease in taxes of the non-neighbors started only around 1996-1997. More-
over, we observe that this decrease in corporate tax rates is independent of
the size of the country. For example the tax rate of Germany decreased by
18.2% during the period, while the tax rate of a large non-neighbor country
like France only decreased by 3.7%.
3.3 Related Literature on Fiscal Reaction Func-
tions
Mukand & Rodrik (2005) point out that countries mimic policies of
their neighbors even when this is not the best solution for their economic
situation. This mimicking behavior can also be found in (corporate) tax
competition. Theoretical and empirical work point out that countries or
regions do not set their tax rate independently, but take into account the
tax rates in related countries or regions. Countries or regions do this in
accordance with two reasons: yardstick competition and capital tax com-
petition. The ¯rst theory poses that voters judge policy-makers on their
performance by comparing tax rates of neighboring countries. Therefore,
politicians, to ascertain their re-election, will `tax mimic' their neighbors'
tax rate. The second theory argues that countries compete to attract capital
by setting lower tax rates. It is not always clear whether the presence of
`tax mimicking' comes from yardstick or tax competition, since the empir-
ical method for both theories is the same (Brueckner 2003). With regard
to corporate taxes, Devereux et al. (2008) argue that yardstick competition
can be eliminated as a possible explanation. The reason is that corporate
taxes are not a critical topic for voters to evaluate policy-makers, certainly
because most voters do not even know the domestic corporate tax rate. On
the other hand, Bordignon (2007) comes to the conclusion that yardstick
and ¯scal competition usually work one against the other. In this chapter,
we cannot distinguish between both forms of competition. Our goal is to
study intergovernmental competition in corporate taxes in order to attract
foreign investment.
Empirical studies estimate a ¯scal reaction function of a certain juris-
diction which relates the tax rate of this jurisdiction to its own characteristics
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of Statutory Tax Rates in Europe
Neighbors: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy and Greece;
Non-neighbors: Spain, France, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal
The STR is not weighed. Source: KPMG3.3. Related Literature on Fiscal Reaction Functions
and to the tax rate in competing jurisdictions. When tax rates are chosen
strategically, the reaction function has a nonzero slope indicating that com-
petitors' tax rates in°uence the given jurisdiction's choice. The sign of the
slope can be positive or negative depending on the speci¯c parameter val-
ues. If strategic interaction is absent, the slope of the reaction function
is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (Brueckner & Saavedra 2001). This
methodology has been used in many articles on local property, business or
personal taxes (Besley & Case (1995), Bordignon et al. (2002), Heyndels
& Vuchelen (1998), Brueckner (1998), Brett & Pinkse (2000), Brueckner &
Saavedra (2001), Carlsen et al. (2005), Buettner (2001), Ladd (1992), Allers
& Elhorst (2005), Hayashi & Boadway (2001), Allers & Elhorst (2005), etc)
and government expenditure levels (Oll¶ e (2003), Figlio et al. (1999), Revelli
(2003), Case et al. (1993), Geys (2006), Baicker (2005), Werck et al. (2007),
etc) across jurisdictions within one country3.
Devereux et al. (2008) analyze strategic tax competition in 21 OECD
countries in the period 1982-1999. They ¯nd that countries strategically
compete over the statutory tax rate and EATR4 and that countries with
relatively high e®ective tax rates react more strongly to tax rates in other
countries. A second study examining strategic tax competition between
countries and the ¯rst using only EU countries is Altshuler & Goodspeed
(2002). They ¯nd that EU countries strategically compete with geographi-
cally close countries using corporate tax revenues over GDP, but not using
personal income tax revenues. They also conclude that since the US tax
reform of 1986, European countries compete to a lesser extent with the
US on corporate tax rates. A second study using exclusively European
countries is Redoano (2003). She shows that tax competition mainly oc-
curs between geographically close countries using statutory tax rates for 13
European countries during the period 1980-1995. Finally, Ruiz & Gerard
(2007) ¯nd empirical evidence of limited `tax mimicking' between neighbor-
ing EU15 countries using statutory and e®ective tax rates during the period
1989-2001. They argue that possible converging tax rates in the EU15 can
explain their weaker result of spatial tax competition.
3See Brueckner (2003) for an overview of empirical studies on strategic interaction
4EATR= e®ective average tax rate calculated using the forward looking method, see
Devereux et al. (2002).
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This chapter will extend the limited number of studies using ¯scal re-
action functions on exclusively European Union countries. In particular, the
impact of changes in the tax rates of the new member states (EU10) on the
tax rates of the EU14 will be the focus. Furthermore, di®erent de¯nitions of
neighbors will be used to gain insights in the spatial tax competition process
in the EU25 during the period 1993-2006.
3.4 The model
A ¯rst step in illustrating which role distance to a peripheral region or
country has in tax competition is to set up a theoretical framework. In our
model two countries A and B are located on a ¯xed distance x from each
other as illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Spatial tax competition: a theoretical framework
Country A and B compete for the location of a single ¯rm, a multi-
national that does not compete with the domestic ¯rms5. Pro¯ts by the
multinational are repatriated to third country C. This multinational will set
5The assumption that the MNE is a monopoly with a competitive fringe and so does not
compete with domestic ¯rms is needed to keep the model tractable analytically, without
changing the qualitative implications of the model.3.4. The model
up in only one of the countries and sell to the other country by exporting.
The locations are symmetric in the sense that set up costs and marginal
production costs are assumed to be the same, therefore in comparing loca-
tion A and B they will not a®ect the location decision of the multinational
and can be dropped from the analysis. To export to the other country, the
multinational will have to pay a transportation cost c which is related to
the distance x between the countries.
A ¯nal assumption is that country A is a more developed country in
terms of infrastructure, technology, etc. While country B is less attractive
for production, we call it a peripheral country. This assumption is translated
in a larger market size for country A, indicated by M, than for country B,
indicated by m, (M >> m). The order of events in the model is as follows.
² Stage 1: Governments A and B set their tax rate simultaneously6.
² Stage 2: the multinational makes its location decision.
² Stage 3: the multinational sells and exports an equilibrium output
that maximizes its pro¯ts.
We solve the model backwards, introducing additional formal notation
as required7. In stage 3, the multinational (MNE) sells and exports a certain
output to maximize its pro¯ts. Using the inverse demand functions of both
countries A and B
PA = (M ¡ QA) (3.1)
PB = (m ¡ QB);
where PA and PB are the prices and QA and QB the domestic outputs, the
after-tax pro¯t of the multinational if it sets up in A is:
¼A = ((M ¡ QA)QA + (m ¡ QAB)QAB ¡ cxQAB)(1 ¡ tA) (3.2)
6We acknowledge that there might be a time inconsistency problem, but we assume
here that both countries commit to the tax rate they have set in stage 1 (Hau°er &
Wooton 2001).
7The detailed computations are described in the Appendix.
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and if it sets up in B is:
¼B = [(m ¡ QB)QB + (M ¡ QBA)QBA ¡ cxQBA](1 ¡ tB) (3.3)
where QAB and QBA are the exported outputs, tA (tB) is the corporate tax
rate of country A (B) and 0< tA(tB) <1.
Maximizing these after-tax pro¯ts leads us to the equilibrium outputs




















In order for the outputs to be positive, the following conditions must be
true: M > cx and m > cx. Using the equilibrium outputs in equations (3.4)
and (3.5) gives the equilibrium after-tax pro¯ts in the case the multinational
would set up in A or B respectively:
¼¤
A =
M2 + (m ¡ cx)2
4
(1 ¡ tA) (3.6)
¼¤
B =
m2 + (M ¡ cx)2
4
(1 ¡ tB)
The second stage of the model deals with the MNE's location decision.
The multinational will be indi®erent in its location preference when its after-





From this we can derive the 'indi®erence' tax rate:
) t
Indiff
A = ¡(1 ¡ tB)(
m2 + (M ¡ cx)2
M2 + (m ¡ cx)2) + 1 (3.8)
=
2cx(M ¡ m) + tB(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
M2 + (m ¡ cx)2
For this tax rate set by country A, the multinational is indi®erent between
setting up in country A or B. The 'indi®erence' tax rate is among others a3.4. The model
function of the tax rate of the other country, market size of both countries,
transport cost and distance x.
As a consequence, country A has two options in the ¯rst stage where
both countries set their tax rates simultaneously. Country A can set its
tax rate below or above t
Indiff
A and both options will result in a di®erent
welfare function. We assume that the welfare function consists of consumer
surplus (CS), and tax revenue from taxing the ¯rm's pro¯t. As in Hau°er
& Wooton (2001) the home base of our multinational is outside country A
and B so that after-tax pro¯ts will be shifted abroad and do not enter the
welfare function8 The welfare function (W) in general can thus be written
as follows





If country A chooses option 1 and sets a tax rate a fraction lower than
t
Indiff
A , then the multinational will ¯nd country A more attractive and will
locate in A. Country A will receive tax incomes from taxing the ¯rm's pro¯t.
On the other hand, if country A chooses to set its tax rate above t¤
A (option
2), then the ¯rm will ¯nd country B a better location. As a consequence,
country A loses its tax income and consumer surplus in this option will be
lower than in the ¯rst option due to transport costs (see Appendix for a
proof).
This argument can be summarized as follows
tA < t¤






A ) WA2 = CS2
It can be shown that welfare for A under option 1 is higher than under
option 2, therefore country A will set its tax rate a fraction epsilon below
t
Indiff
A . The same result is achieved when we maximize the welfare in option
1. Maximizing this welfare shows that the optimal tax rate should be as large
8Including the ¯rm's after-tax pro¯ts into the welfare function would not change our
basic result, on the contrary it would strengthen the outcome. But our approach makes
the algebra simpler.





M2 + (M ¡ cx)2
4
(3.11)
This indicates that the optimal tax rate for country A should be as close
as possible to t
Indiff
A or in other words, country A will set its tax rate a






2cx(M ¡ m) + tB(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
M2 + (m ¡ cx)2 ¡ »: (3.12)
The same story holds for country B such that
t¤
B =
2cx(m ¡ M) + tA(M2 + (m ¡ cx)2)
m2 + (M ¡ cx)2 ¡ » (3.13)
From the above equation (3.12), it can be veri¯ed that t¤
A is larger than t¤
B as
long as t¤
B > ¡1, which was an assumption (0 < t¤
B < 1. In addition, it can
be veri¯ed that the tax rate of country A will always be positive if M > m,
which is an assumption of the model. The tax rate for country B can be
negative even under this assumption of M > m, which implies that country
B would be willing to subsidize the multinational to attract its settlement to
country B. Moreover, there is a positive relation between the market size and
the tax rate, indicating that larger countries can set higher tax rates as in
Hau°er & Wooton (2001) (see proof in appendix). Furthermore, equations





0): a higher tax in country B will lead country A to set a higher tax rate as
well. This indicates that if country B increases its tax rate, country A can
also set a higher tax rate without inducing the ¯rm to move to country B.
But it also works the other way around, if country B decreases its tax rate,
country A must set a lower tax rate in order not to lose the multinational.
This brings us to the main question in this chapter, namely what hap-
pens if country A would be located closer or further away from the peripheral
country B. In other words what would happen to the tax rate of A if dis-
tance x between the countries was smaller? For this we take the comparative




= 2c(1 ¡ tB)(M2 + m2 ¡ c2x2)(M ¡ m) > 0 (3.14)3.5. Methodology and Data
Equation (3.14) implies that the tax rate of country A is a positive
function of distance between the two countries. This indicates that a coun-
try A closer to the low tax country B will set lower taxes. This suggests that
spatial dimensions matter in tax competition. A country closer to low tax
region is subject to more tax competition and the model predicts a lower tax
rate. Take for example Germany, adjacent to a new member state Poland,
and the UK, not neighboring a new member state. A multinational willing
to invest in Germany will reconsider this strategy and may set up in Poland
due to lower labor costs and taxes. Since Germany is a neighbor, transport
costs will be low. But if the multinational initially wants to invest in the UK,
setting up a production center in Poland will be less obvious. The outcome
of the theoretical model can be summarized in the following propositions.
PROPOSITION 1: There is spatial tax competition and spatial reac-
tion functions are upward sloping.
PROPOSITION 2: EU14 countries closer to the new member states ex-
perience more tax competition and will set lower tax rates.
3.5 Methodology and Data
To test these theoretical propositions empirically, a ¯scal reaction func-
tions for the EU14 countries will be estimated. As explained in section 2.3,
a ¯scal reaction function has a nonzero slope when countries strategically
react to tax rates in other countries. We investigate the reaction of the
EU14 on the new member states (NMS) for the period 1993-2006. We do
this at the basis of the following speci¯cation:




+¯3Xi;t + ®i + "it
In the above expression (3.15), the dependent variable TAX is the statu-
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tory tax rate of country i in the EU149 at time t10. On the right hand side,
the model includes the lagged dependent TAX variable, the weighed tax rate
of the 10 new member states11 (wijTAXjNMS;t), a set of country control
variables (X)12 such as population density, GDP per capita and the lagged
personal income tax rate13, country ¯xed e®ects (®i) and time dummies (±t).
The weighed tax rates of the new member states is our main variable
of interest. This variable is the weighed sum of the statutory corporate tax










For the weight, di®erent measures from the theory will be used. Ac-
cording to Besley & Case (1995), spatial models typically use geographical
weights for 2 reasons. First, geographic neighbors are likely to experience
similar shocks and therefore neighbors' tax rates are more informative than
tax rates in far away districts. A second reason is that information about
policy decisions in nearby countries spreads quicker. To capture our re-
search question, we will use here the inverse distance between the capital
cities of countries of the EU14 and the new member states. The data on
distance is collected from the CEPII database. Distance is measured as the
distance between capital cities following the great circle formula, which uses
latitudes and longitudes of the cities and incorporates the internal distance
of the country based on areas (Head & Mayer 2002)14.
9EU14= Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, UK,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Italy and Greece
10All data on corporate tax rates are collected from KPMG (2006)'s tax surveys and
were available for 1993-2006.
11Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Malta and Cyprus
12The control variables, population density and GDP per capita are collected from the
world development indicators (WDI), while the personal income tax rate is available in
the OECD database until 2004
13personal income tax rate is lagged by one period since this variable is possible endoge-
nous
14Other studies use more sophisticated measures of distance (Davis & Weinstein 2003).3.5. Methodology and Data
In addition, six other weighing schemes will be used to gain insight in
the EU14 tax competition game. The most widely used de¯nition of neigh-
bors is based on a common border (contiguity). In this de¯nition the weight
wij equals 1 if country i has a common land or water border with country
j and 0 otherwise. A third spatial weight is based on the idea that also
neighbors of second order can be a®ected by changes in the corporate tax
rates of the EU10 countries. In this case, wij equals 1 if country i is has
a common border with an adjacent neighbor of country j and 0 otherwise.
The ¯fth weight is the share of trade (export + import) with country j in
GDP of country i15. Finally, the sixth weighing scheme is based on the
inverse distance between GDP per capita and is constructed as follows16:
1=(GDPi;t ¡ GDPj;t)
P
j 1=(GDPi;t ¡ GDPj;t)
(3.17)
Note that these last two weights, trade share and GDP per capita are allowed
to be time variant17. All weights are normalized so that their sum equals 1.
By estimating speci¯cation (3.15) several econometric issues pop up.
First, including a lagged dependent variable in a ¯xed e®ects model will
lead to correlation since ¯xed e®ects are time invariant (Woolridge 2003).
A possible solution is to estimate equation (3.15) in ¯rst di®erences in order
to get rid of this correlation. Taking ¯rst di®erences will lead to corre-
lation between the lagged dependent variable in di®erences and the error
term in di®erences, thus the lagged dependent variable in di®erences should
be instrumented with lags of two or more periods. Second, our variable
of interest, the weighed tax rate of the NMS, could be endogenous: tax
rates of the EU14 will in°uence the tax rates of the new member states as
well. To solve this problem, the instrumental variables method (2SLS) is
frequently applied in the ¯scal reaction literature (Brueckner (2003), Alt-
shuler & Goodspeed (2002), Redoano (2003), Heyndels & Vuchelen (1998),
Brett & Pinkse (2000), Carlsen et al. (2005), Oll¶ e (2003), Figlio et al. (1999),
But for our research question, distance between capital cities is a good indicator of distance
between countries.
15Trade data is collected from IMF database and GDP data is collected from Eurostat
16Data on GDP per capita is collected from Eurostat.
17Except for Redoano (2003) previous studies used weights based on the average of a
variable over time.
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Revelli (2002), Ladd (1992), Buettner (2003), Geys (2006), Baicker (2005),
Werck et al. (2007) and Allers & Elhorst (2005)). Table 3.1 shows several
speci¯cation of (3.15) that were tested.
The ¯rst column in Table 3.1 estimates equation (3.15) using OLS and
country ¯xed e®ects. The second column uses an autoregressive ¯xed e®ects
model to include the autocorrelation of the EU14 tax rates. As explained
above, an OLS estimation procedure is not correct since the weighed tax
rates of the NMS are endogenous. Therefore, column (3) estimates a ¯xed
e®ects model and instruments the endogenous variable, WTaxNMS;t. As a







wijXjNMS + ®2XiEU14 + ½jt (3.18)






+¯3XiEU14;t + ®iEU14 + "it
Finally, column (4) will include a lagged dependent variable. Taking into
account that this is correlated with the ¯xed e®ects, we will take ¯rst di®er-
ences and instrument the lagged dependent variable in di®erences with lags
of 2 or more periods. In symbols, our ¯nal estimation procedure is:















The result shows that a decrease by 10% in the tax rates of the new
member states (EU10), will induce a reduction by 18% in the tax rates of
the EU14 countries that are on a close distance to the new member states.
The p-value of the Sargan test is larger than 0.1 and thus implies that our
instruments are valid.3.6. Results
Table 3.1: Model construction
dep var.=taxEU14 (1) (2) (3) (4)
xtreg xtregar xtivreg, fe IV, lag, fe
Taxi;t¡1 -0.09
(0.13)
WTaxNMS;t 0.79*** 0.16 0.97*** 1.83***
(0.1) (0.14) (0.17) (0.86)
Income taxi;t¡1 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.41
(0.14) (0.21) (0.14) (0.31)
GDP per capitai;t 0.001*** -0.0004 0.001*** 0.002**
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001)
Population densityi;t 0.11 -0.27 0.15 0.38
(0.09) (0.24) (0.1) (0.35)
Constant -20.65 82.66*** -39.92* 0.68
(16.59) (8.37) (22.53) (0.82)
Obs 169 156 169 156
R squared 0.43 0.04 0.42
Sargan test (p-value) 0.8
Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments used for WTaxNMS;t: the proportion of
the population younger than 14 years, population density and the number of active residents.
note:***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Table 3.2: Estimation results
dep var.=taxEU14 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ireland Neighb. Non-neighb. '95-'06 lag instit.
Taxi;t¡1 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12
(0.09) (0.22) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
WTaxNMS;t 1.99* 0.17 1.8** 0.3 1.62*









Income taxi;t¡1 -0.15 -0.23 0.09 -0.41 -0.36 -0.35
(0.2) (0.49) (0.23) (0.82) (0.33) (0.31)
GDP per capitai;t 0.001 0.003 0.0003 0.002* 0.002** 0.001*
(0.001) (002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Population densityi;t 0.37 3.57 -0.02 0.38 0.34 0.32
(0.29) (3.23) (0.19) (0.35) (0.37) (0.34)
Constant -0.18 -1.35 -0.08 0.68 -1.5** 0.57
(0.5) (1.54) (0.61) (0.82) (0.66) (0.99)
Obs 156 56 72 156 156 143
Sargan test (p-value) 0.06 0.8 0.19 0.8 0.6 0.31
Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments used for WTaxNMS;t: the proportion of the
population younger than 14 years, population density and the number of active residents. In column
(6) the instruments for WTaxNMS;t are an indicator of enterprise reforms, trade liberalization and
competition policy. note:***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and
10 percent levels.3.6. Results
3.6 Results
The estimation results of equation (3.19) are reported in Table 3.2. In
all speci¯cations in the table, EU14 countries react to tax changes in the
new member states. Since Ireland's tax rate decreased sharply from 1997
onwards, this country was not included in the ¯scal reaction function. But
it is possible that the low tax rate of Ireland, provokes more intense tax
competition in the other EU countries. In Column (1) of Table 3.2, Ireland
is included in the group of distance weighed tax rates, WTaxNMS;t. The
coe±cient is still positively signi¯cant, indicating that EU14 countries react
to tax changes in the new member states and Ireland.
Columns (2) and (3) split up the sample in direct neighbors (Italy, Ger-
many, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Greece) and non-neighbors
(Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, UK, Portugal and Spain) of
the new member states (NMS). The estimations show that only the neigh-
bors react to the tax rate of the new member states and that these neigh-
bors. Moreover, the neighbors of the new member states do not react to
tax rates of the NMS' non-neighbors. This result indicates very clearly that
tax changes in the new member states a®ect mostly the neighbors of these
countries. As a consequence, this might be the reason why Ruiz & Gerard
(2007) ¯nd a weak tax mimicking result between neighboring EU15 coun-
tries. It is rather distance to a low tax country or region that matters in
European tax competition.
Since Finland, Austria and Sweden only joined the European Union in
1995, column (4) estimates equation (3.19) for a shorter period 1995-2006.
Also in this shorter period, the reaction of the EU14 on taxes in the new
member states is still positively signi¯cant.
In general, tax competition models predict that tax rates are jointly
determined and hence indicate endogeneity of WTaxNMS;t (Devereux et al.
2008), (Brueckner 1998). But it seems very plausible that the government
in each country sets its tax as a best response to taxes of the new member
states in the previous period. Therefore, column (5) includes a lagged term
of WTaxNMS;t. We observe that the simultaneous reaction is not signi¯cant
anymore, while the lagged reaction is positive and signi¯cant. Although a
Wald test cannot reject that coe±cients of both variables are equal, this
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would suggest that EU14 countries' react rather to taxes of the new member
states in the previous period.
Finally, column (6) uses a di®erent set of instrumental variables for
WTaxNMS;t, namely institutional variables such as measures of enterprise
reforms, trade liberalization and competition policy18. The result shows
that EU14 countries react positively and signi¯cantly to taxes in the new
member states. The Sargan test con¯rms the validity of the instruments,
but is lower than the benchmark IV regression in column (4) of Table 3.1.
Two country control variables in estimations in Table 3.2 show the
expected sign, but are not always signi¯cant. First, countries with higher
incomes, as measured by GDP per capita, have higher corporate tax rates.
This is consistent with the literature that a higher country income is related
to higher demands for public services and thus higher corporate tax rates
to ¯nance these public services (Altshuler & Goodspeed 2002). Second, also
consistent with the literature suggesting that tax competition will lead to
a movement away from taxes on mobile factors toward taxes on immobile
factors (Altshuler & Goodspeed (2002), Wilson (1999)), the coe±cient on
the lagged personal tax rate is negative. This indicates that a lower personal
income tax rate might be compensated by a higher corporate tax rate.
3.7 Robustness checks
Table 3.4 reports some robustness checks of the previous results. In-
stead of estimating the reaction of the EU14 to the aggregate taxes of the
NMS, column (1) splits up the NMS in smaller groups of countries: the
Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), Ireland and the 5 largest
NMS (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). Cyprus
and Malta are left out since these countries are very small and have al-
most no neighbors. Only the coe±cient of the group of the 5 largest NMS
(Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) is positive and
signi¯cant, implying that the EU14 reacts mainly to these 5 new member
states.
Secondly, columns (2) to (5) test other weights of the NMS' taxes. First
18These institutional variables are collected from the EBRD reports3.7. Robustness checks
column (2) uses a dummy equal to 1 if country i is an adjacent neighbor of
a NMS, while in column (2) the weight is a dummy equal to 1 if country
i has a common border with an adjacent neighbor of an NMS. None of
these weighed tax rates are signi¯cant. Possibly these types of weights are
too roughly de¯ned. Moreover, we could not ¯nd valid instruments for
this variable as the Sargan p-values point out. In column (3) the weight
is the share of trade with country j in GDP of country i. The argument
is that EU14 countries might react more to taxes of their trading partners.
The coe±cient is positive and signi¯cant, indicating that EU14 countries
react to taxes of the NMS in particular if these NMS are their trading
partners. But the coe±cient is very small. In column (5) we test whether
EU14 countries compete over taxes against countries with similar economic
characteristics. The result is positive, but not signi¯cant, which could imply
that a geographical neighbor is more important than economic similarity in
the ¯scal reaction of EU14 countries to NMS19.
Finally, the last column uses the e®ective tax rate of the NMS instead
of the o±cial tax rate. This reaction function is not signi¯cant which would
imply that EU14 countries do not take into account the e®ective tax rates
of NMS in setting their own e®ective tax rates. These results are in contrast
to Devereux et al. (2008) who ¯nd no signi¯cant competition in STRs for
OECD countries but they do ¯nd competition in e®ective tax rates. A
possible reason for this di®erence is that they use a di®erent method to
calculate e®ective tax rates 20. Moreover, we have observed (see Figure
4.3) that e®ective tax rates in Europe are quite stable. Tax reforms in
Europe are characterized by decreasing tax rates, but an increasing taxable
basis and thus stable e®ective tax rates. Taking ¯rst di®erences of the
weighted e®ective tax rates will not show much variation. This may o®er an
explanation for the di®erent results we ¯nd here.
19 Redoano (2003) also did not ¯nd signi¯cant tax competition between economically
similar (GDP per capita) EU13 countries
20They calculate the ETR by the method of Devereux et al. (2002). For a complete
overview of ETR calculations see Nicodµ eme (2001).
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Table 3.3: Robustness Checks
dep var.=taxEU14 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FON SON trade GDP etr
Taxi;t¡1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.27***
(0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.21) (0.09)
WTaxSI;SV;CZ;PO;HU;t 0.01** 0.04 0.05
(0.005) (0.05) (0.03)
WTaxbaltic;t 0.01 0.07 -0.06
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06)











Income taxi;t¡1 -0.02 -0.18 0.01 -0.09 -1.13 0.007
(0.2) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (1.11) (0.01)
GDP per capitai;t 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.002* 0.00003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00003)
Population densityi;t 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.96 -0.009
(0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.9) (0.01)
Constant -0.56 -0.95*** -0.89*** -0.4 2.86 -0.01
(0.36) (0.27) (0.29) (0.52) (3.13) (0.02)
Obs 156 156 156 104 143 144
Sargan test (p-value) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.13 0.29 0.97
Standard errors are in parentheses. Column (1) splits WTaxNMS;t up into smaller groups of
countries and instruments with lags. Column (2) weights the taxes of NMS by a dummy equal
to 1 if country i is an adjacent neighbor of a NMS, while column (3) uses a dummy equal to 1
if country i is a second order neighbor of a NMS. The weight in column (3) is the share of trade
(export+import) from country i to the NMS in GDP of i. In column (4) the taxes of NMS are
weighed with the distance in GDP per capita between both countries. Finally, column (5) uses
the distance weighed e®ective tax rates (etr) of the NMS. All weighed variables, WTaxNMS;t are
instrumented with their lag. note:***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively
1, 5 and 10 percent levels.3.8. Conclusion
3.8 Conclusion
During the past decade corporate tax rates decreased greatly in the
'old EU14. Especially, Germany and Italy experienced the largest decrease
in their tax rates. Both countries are neighbors of the `new' EU10. This
chapter analyzes strategic tax setting in the 'old' EU14 as a reaction to the
tax rates in the new member states. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst
chapter studying the impact of the new EU member states on tax rates of
the old Europe.
A spatial competition model is developed to predict the role of distance
in tax competition. The model predicts that tax competition is more intense
between geographically close countries. This result has been empirically
veri¯ed for the EU14 during the period 1993-2006 using a ¯scal reaction
function approach. Estimations show that only neighbors of the new member
states seem to react to low taxes of these new members. Therefore, our
theoretical propositions are con¯rmed. Moreover, we observe that neighbors
of the new member states react far less to changes in the tax rate of other
EU14 countries. To put it di®erently, the corporate tax rate of a country
like Germany responds to changes in the tax rate of the new neighboring
member states in the East like Czech Republic, but will respond much less
to the tax rate in the West, say Belgium. When using other de¯nitions of
neighbors we only ¯nd weak spatial tax competition among trading partners.
The resulting spatial dimension of tax competition in this chapter will
also have implications for transfer pricing. Since we ¯nd that neighbors of
Eastern Europe are subject to more intense tax competition, tax di®erences
between these countries will become smaller. As a consequence smaller tax
di®erences are likely to induce less pro¯t shifting towards Eastern Europe. In
addition, smaller tax di®erentials will also stimulate decentralization choices
of multinationals as pointed out by Nielsen et al. (2007).
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3.9 Appendix A
Figure 3.6: Map of EU25
New member states (EU10= black)= Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia
Neighbors of NMS (dark grey)= Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece
non-neighbors (light grey)= Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, Spain and Portugal
Ireland (grey)3.10. Appendix B
3.10 Appendix B
The computations of the model in section 3.4 in more detail:
The inverse demand functions are derived from:
Q = M ¡ bP where for simplicity is assumed that b=1. ) PA = M ¡ QA
and PB = M ¡ QB.
Using these inverse demand functions, the after-tax pro¯ts in country A and
B are respectively
¼A = (M ¡ QA)QA(1 ¡ tA) (3.21)
¼B = [(m ¡ QB)QB + (M ¡ QAB)QAB ¡ cx2QAB](1 ¡ tB)
Maximizing the after-tax pro¯ts leads to the equilibrium output. The max-
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[2cx + tB2(M ¡ cx)][M2 + (m ¡ cx)2] ¡ 2M(2cx(M ¡ m))
[M2 + (m ¡ cx)2]2 (3.25)
¡2M(tB(m2 + (M ¡ cx)2)
[M2 + (m ¡ cx)2]2
=
2(1 ¡ tB)cx[(m ¡ cx)2 + M(2m ¡ M)]
[M2 + (m ¡ cx)2]2 > 03.10. Appendix B





¢gdp per capitai;t 0.0004 -0.001***
(0.001) (0.003)




¢Wijpopulation > 14yj;t -0.37 -0.83*
(0.81) (0.51)
¢Wijpopulation densityj;t 0.35 -0.07
(0.33) (0.21)





Standard errors are in parentheses. note:***,** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at






During communism, trade amongst Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) was centrally planned and international openness was
low. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 led to the collapse of these arti¯-
cial trade relations amongst Central and Eastern European countries. This
event was the start of a long process during which Central and East Eu-
ropean countries had to adapt their economic, political and institutional
situation to the standards of a market economy. Trade °ows rapidly re-
orientated to the EU. As a consequence, the EU15 became the main trade
partner of Central and Eastern Europe. The process of trade integration be-
tween Central and Eastern Europe and the EU15 during the nineties o®ers
us a unique opportunity to analyze the empirical relationship between trade
integration and export specialization. Moreover, this chapter will explore
whether lower e®ective tax rates (ETR) play a role in export specializa-
tion. It can be expected that if ¯rms in particular sectors bene¯t from a
tax advantage, the country will become more specialized in those sectors
0This chapter is based on co-authored work with M. Beine
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and thus overall export specialization is going to increase. In addition, the
institutional changes in Central and Eastern Europe allow to study the im-
pact of two types of institutional reforms on export specialization. Note
that this chapter is not a sectoral study, but will analyze the e®ects of trade
integration, corporate e®ective tax rates and institutional reforms on export
specialization in Central and Eastern Europe during the period 1989-2000.
Specialization of industries is an important issue because it makes coun-
tries more dependent on a few industries and thus increases the risk of a
sector-speci¯c shock (Koren & Tenreyro 2004). Since 12 of the 13 Central
and East European countries in our sample became EU members in 2004
and 2007, their exposure to sector-speci¯c shocks is of great interest to the
EU15 as well. We observe gradually declining EU15 tari®s on Central and
East European exports for the period 1989-2000. Over the same period, in-
stitutional reforms had increased rapidly. Two types of institutional reforms
are analyzed: enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms. Enterprise
reforms focus on credit and subsidy policies for ¯rms and competition policy
reforms. Both measures of institutional reforms are an indication of how well
the countries perform in the restructuring of their policies and institutions
from planned-economy to market-economy based standards. The average
e®ective tax rate has decreased from 1997 onwards in Central Europe. This
means that ¯rms in general have been less taxed since 1997. A ¯nal obser-
vation is that the average export specialization in Central Europe is not a
monotonic process. A Her¯ndhal index of export specialization in 13 former
transition countries1 is used as a proxy for industrial specialization. A higher
value of the index refers to more export specialization, whereas a Her¯ndahl
index closer to zero implies more export diversi¯cation. In the beginning
of the nineties, export specialization increased sharply. After 1992, average
exports in Central Europe diversi¯ed, while from 1997 onwards export spe-
cialization increased again. The aim of this chapter is to analyze whether
trade integration and institutional reforms can explain the pattern of ex-
port specialization that we observe in the data. Using a dynamic panel
model, the long- and short-run e®ects of changes in tari®s with the EU15
1Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey
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on changes in export specialization in Central Europe can be disentangled.
This is important because a shock in tari®s cannot be expected to have the
same immediate and long-run e®ect on export specialization.
We ¯nd ¯rst that trade liberalization with the EU15 increases export
specialization in Central Europe in the long-run. Second, institutional re-
forms stimulate export specialization as well. The results show that enter-
prise reforms such as restructuring credit, subsidy and bankruptcy policies
towards more market-economy standards, increase the degree of export spe-
cialization signi¯cantly. An increase on the performance of enterprise re-
forms of 1 unit, increases export specialization by 28%. We did not ¯nd
signi¯cant evidence on the role of corporate taxes which could be due to the
nature of our tax measure. Also an indicator of corruption did not have a
signi¯cant e®ect on export specialization.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related
literature on the relationship between trade integration, taxes, institutions
and export specialization and section 4.3 shows some stylized facts. Section
4.4 explains the methodology, while section 4.5 describes the data. Section
4.6 discusses the benchmark results and robustness checks. Finally, section
4.8 discusses the results and section 4.9 brie°y concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
4.2.1 Trade Integration and Export Specialization
The ¯rst stream of literature that we discuss here argues that trade
integration or trade liberalization stimulates a country to specialize in a
given or a few sectors. Traditional trade theories have shown that trade
liberalization results in increasing specialization in sectors where a country
has a comparative advantage because of di®erences in technology or factor
endowments between countries. Also new trade theories predict that coun-
tries specialize in sectors which are subject to economies of scale. Trade
liberalization decreases the number of varieties of goods in a country to cut
down on their average costs. According to the new economic geography the-
ory, when trade costs decrease, ¯rms will choose a location where they ¯nd
a higher demand for their products and where they ¯nd the largest pool of4.2. Related Literature
intermediate good producers. Proximity to suppliers and consumers reduces
trade costs and may generate external economies of scale. As a consequence,
regional specialization increases when trade costs are reduced (Amiti (1999),
De Bruyne (2004) and Baldwin et al. (1999)).
The empirical literature provides evidence of increasing specialization
in Western Europe ((Amiti 1999), (Brulhart 1998)) and Central and Eastern
Europe. Traistaru et al. (2003) came to the conclusion that trade integration
leads to higher regional specialization in ¯ve Eastern European countries2
during the period 1990-1999. Similarly, the study by Hildebrandt & WÄ orz
(2004) shows for 8 Central and Eastern European countries3 greater indus-
trial specialization during the period 1993-2000. One drawback of these
studies is that usually trade integration is captured merely by a time trend
assuming that trade integration is a linear process. In contrast, Tre°er
(2004) and Beine & Coulombe (2007) measure trade integration by tari®s.
Tre°er (2004) provides evidence that a free trade agreement (FTA) between
the US and Canada leads to trade creation, increased labor productivity,
but reduced employment for manufacturing workers in Canada. Beine &
Coulombe (2007) suggest that trade liberalization between Canadian re-
gions and the US resulted in more regional export specialization for Canada
in the short-run, but less regional export specialization in the long-run. The
authors suggest that better access to suppliers and customers or positive
spillovers may trigger other industries to locate in the initially specialized
region and induce diversi¯cation of economic activities in the long-run.
This study tests the impact of European integration of 13 Central and
East European countries4 on export specialization in Central and Eastern
Europe5. Based on trade theory, we expect a positive relation between trade
integration and export specialization. But given the transition economy his-
tory of the countries in the sample, we also need to take other elements into
account as possible determinants of export specialization such as institu-
2Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia
3Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and
Slovenia
4Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey
5In contrast Tre°er (2004) and Beine & Coulombe (2007) studied export specialization
between two industrialized countries.
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tional reforms.
4.2.2 Corporate taxes and Export Specialization
In the literature, the e®ect of corporate taxes on export specialization
has not been studied explicitly. Lambertini & Peri (2000) develop a model
that shows how the government can use ¯scal policy to promote specializa-
tion. They illustrate that the government can set a lower commodity tax for
the sector they wish to specialize in. Although this model uses an industry
speci¯c sales tax, it can also apply to corporate taxes and sector-speci¯c
tax incentives. An empirical study by Devereux et al. (n.d.) observes that
plants in the UK choose to locate near other plants of the same industry and
new foreign-owned plants choose to locate near other foreign-owned plants
within the same industry. But ¯scal incentives in the form of government
grants for new plants in areas with high unemployment slightly in°uence
the location of ¯rms.
Two related studies examined the e®ectiveness of R&D tax incentives.
Hines (1999) analyzes the e®ect of the US treatment on the R&D activi-
ties of American multinationals. In the 1980s, American tax law changes
reduced the tax deductions for R&D expenses. As a consequence, American
multinationals were expected to increase their fraction of R&D in foreign
locations. Hines (1999) observes that American multinationals responded
signi¯cantly to the changes in R&D tax treatment, but moved only very few
of their R&D activities to foreign centers. Bloom et al. (2002) investigate
the responsiveness of R&D investment on tax changes in nine countries.
They come to the conclusion that tax changes signi¯cantly a®ect the level
of R&D in these countries.
From these studies we can conclude that taxes can in°uence sector and
¯rm behavior. As a consequence, it is possible that corporate taxes in°uence
export specialization as well.
4.2.3 Institutional Reforms and Export Specialization
In addition to the literature on trade integration, there is a growing
literature on the importance of institutions for various measures of eco-
nomic performance. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) show that West-4.3. Stylized Facts
ern countries with better access to the Atlantic ports had higher growth
rates than Eastern European countries. They observed that countries with
stronger political institutions, property rights and economic institutions
traded more and spurred economic growth. In a more general framework,
Acemoglu et al. (2005a) explain that good economic institutions create a
stimulating environment for investors and producers. Therefore, institu-
tions determine the economic outcome of a country. Also, Dollar & Kraay
(2003) ¯nd that trade and institutions have an impact on growth, but only
in the long run.
With regard to trade, Jansen & Nordas (2004) provide evidence that
countries with better institutions trade more. Moreover, Francois & Manchin
(2007) show that the infrastructure and institutional quality in a coun-
try matter more than tari®s in order to stimulate exports. We will study
whether institutional reforms in a country have an impact on export spe-
cialization. Herefore, we will use two measures of institutional reforms:
enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms which will be explained
in more detail in section 4.5.4.
4.3 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document the trends of the main variables from our
regression analysis in section 4.4.
4.3.1 Trade Integration
Under the centrally planned economy, Central and Eastern Europe had
¯xed prices, quantity and quality and a large shadow economy. Firms were
stimulated to maximize output and employment instead of pro¯ts and ef-
¯ciency. These incentives needed to be changed by transition reforms such
as liberalization and privatization. This transition process started in 1989
and brought unexpected results. Together with price liberalization and pri-
vatization, output and employment decreased, in°ation but also foreign di-
rect investments increased (Roland 2000), (Walsh & Whelan 2001). In the
pre-transition period, a centrally institution de¯ned the bilateral trade re-
lationships between countries. Transition caused almost a total collapse of
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this trade. Central and East European ¯rms needed to reorient trade and
improve products (Rodrik 1994). Figure 4.1 shows that in 1989 most coun-
tries exported already intensively to Western Europe, but also to Russia. In
2000 the export share to Europe increased sharply, while the share of export
to Russia decreased in all countries.
Figure 4.1: The shift of re-orientation to Europe (%), export share 1989-2000
Source: UN (1993, 1997, 2002)
Not only did Central Europe direct its exports more towards the Euro-
pean Union, but also the European Union allowed tari®s to decrease gradu-4.3. Stylized Facts
ally during that period. Figure 4.2 plots the average unweighed tari® of the
EU15 on imports from Central Europe over time. The average tari® started
at an already relatively low level of 4.1% and declined gradually over the
period 1989-2000 with two major drops in 1994 and 1997.
Figure 4.2: Trade liberalization of Central Europe with EU15 (%)
Source: Haveman data
By 1994 most countries6 had signed a Europe agreement with the EU15
which was a bilateral agreement to decrease tari®s. These agreements might
explain the ¯rst large decrease in tari®s in 1994 as illustrated in Figure
4.2. The second large tari® drop occurred between 1996-1997 and could
be explained by the o±cial start of the enlargement process in 1997-1998
when Central Europe adopted the European legislation. One of the chapters
of this legislation deals with free movement of goods and establishing a free
6Poland and Hungary were the ¯rst to sign the Europe agreement in 1991, the Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia followed in 1993, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
signed their Europe agreement in 1995 and ¯nally in 1996 Slovenia signed the Europe
agreement. Turkey, Malta and Cyprus signed the association agreement already in 1963,
1970 and 1972 respectively
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trade area with the EU15. In May 2004, 10 countries became a EU-member7,
followed by Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 so that capital, goods
and services can be freely traded in the EU27. Turkey applied for member
ship, but is not a EU member yet.
4.3.2 Corporate taxes
Figure 4.3: Average e®ective tax rates in Central Europe
Source: Amadeus data
Since governments might give tax incentives to certain sectors, the tax
rate can also be a variable of interest in the regressions later on. The statu-
tory tax rate does not take into account the tax base and tax incentives
for speci¯c companies or sectors. The tax base is the modi¯ed pro¯t of a
company whereon the tax rate is applied to calculate the amount of taxes
the company should pay. Therefore, we prefer to use the e®ective tax rate
(ETR) that does take into account the di®erence between a company's pro¯t
and the tax base (Vandenbussche et al. (2005) and Nicodµ eme (2001)). Fig-
7Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania4.3. Stylized Facts
ure 4.3 illustrates that during the late nineties, e®ective tax rates of ¯rms
in Central Europe increased until 1997, but decreased after 1997. This pe-
riod of increasing e®ective tax rates, 1997-2000, coincides with the period
of increasing export specialization in Figure 4.5. Hence, e®ective tax rates
could matter for export specialization.
4.3.3 Institutional Reform
During the nineties, Central Europe made considerable reforms in in-
stitutions and policies. We use data on two measures for institutional re-
forms, namely enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms, to verify
to what extent institutional reforms in addition to trade integration matter
for export specialization. These variables, from the EBRD reports, indicate
how well these countries perform on the restructuring from plan-economy to
market-economy based institutions. The upper graph of Figure 4.4 suggests
that during the period of our analysis, both types of institutional reforms
have a clear positive trend. A second observation is that for the whole
period, enterprise reforms were stronger than competition policy reforms
and in addition the variable enterprise reforms shows more variation than
competition policy reforms. During these eleven years, Central European
countries increased from score 2 to almost score 3 for both institutional re-
forms. Since institutional reforms are only available for Central and Eastern
European countries, a direct comparison with EU15 scores is not possible.
In order to have some benchmark for these scores, we can compare the coun-
tries among each other according to their degree of development. The lower
graph of Figure 4.4 illustrates that more developed countries in our sample
8 also have higher scores on both institutional reforms. Especially in the
beginning of the period, the gap between countries with a high GDP per
capita and countries with a low GDP per capita9 is large. But from 1992
onwards, less developed countries catch up rapidly, while reforms in more
developed countries remain stable.
8Countries with a GDP per capita above average: Czech Republic, Hungary and Slove-
nia.
9Countries with a GDP per capita below average: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
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Figure 4.4: Average institutional reforms in Central Europe
Source: EBRD reports4.3. Stylized Facts
4.3.4 Export Specialization
Figure 4.5: Average export specialization in Central Europe
Source: Eurostat
In Figure 4.5 we show the evolution of the average export specialization
for 13 Central European countries during the period 1989-2000. As this will
be our depended variable in the regression analysis, it is worth plotting it
over time as we do in Figure 4.5. We measure export specialization by an
Her¯ndahl index on exports which will be explained in more detail in sec-
tion 4.5. The index lies between 0 and 1 and the interpretation is as follows:
a higher value of the index refers to more export specialization, whereas a
Her¯ndahl index closer to zero points out more export diversi¯cation. Fig-
ure 4.5 seems to indicate that export specialization in Central Europe is not
a monotonic process. Since 1989, the start of transition, Eastern European
countries needed to ¯nd their comparative advantage. Walsh & Whelan
(2001) show that ¯rms that produce EU oriented products outperform ¯rms
that sell products historically produced for the Eastern European market
during the ¯rst 7 years of transition. The ¯gure illustrates that in the
early nineties average export specialization increased sharply, probably be-
cause countries redirected their exports after transition. After 1992, export
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specialization decreased which could indicate that Central Europe started
exporting in more and new sectors. While after 1997, export specialization
has increased again, suggesting that the number of sectors the countries are
exporting in, went down. This U-shape is also what Imbs & Wacziarg (2003)
and Koren & Tenreyro (2004) found for other countries: sectoral concentra-
tion is a function of the level of per capita income. Poor countries tend to
diversify to reduce the risk of a sector speci¯c shock, when they grow to
higher levels of per capita income they specialize again but never as high
again as their initial specialization level. But a similar value of the export
specialization index at di®erent moments in time may hide a di®erent sector
specialization. It might be that the export mix has changed over time. We
will add a short discussion on this in section 4.8.
Note that ¯gure 4.5 illustrates the average export specialization for
all 13 countries. Nevertheless, there are di®erences across countries. The
individual evolution of the countries' export specialization is illustrated in
Appendix 4.10. From these ¯gures we observe that export specialization
increased in the most recent years, except for Slovenia, Lithuania, Malta
and Romania.
4.4 Methodology
In order to investigate the relationship between trade integration, in-
stitutions and export specialization, we build on the approach proposed by
Beine & Coulombe (2007) which relies on the estimation of a dynamic panel
model which is derived from an error correction model (See appendix, Vo-
gelvang (2005)). The estimation model is as follows
¢log(Exp spec:i;t) = ®i + ±t + Á1log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) + Á2¢log(tariffEU15i;t) (4.1)
+Á3log(tariffEU15i;t¡1) + Á4Ii;t + Á5ETRi;tÁ0
6Zi;t + ²i;t
where i is a Central or East European country in a certain year t.
Exp spec:i;t is export specialization measured by a Her¯ndahl index based on
annual sectoral trade °ows from Central Europe to the EU15. TariffEU15i;t
is the EU15-tari® on exports from a Central and Eastern European coun-
try i. This measure is based on sectoral tari®s, weighted with the export4.5. Data
structure of country i and aggregated to the country level. ETR is the e®ec-
tive tax rate of country i. Ii;t captures the level of a country's institutional
reforms, ETRi;t is the e®ective tax rate and Zi;t is a vector of other con-
trol variables such as business cycles. Country ¯xed e®ects, ®i, control for
unobserved country-speci¯c e®ects and ±t are time dummies controlling for
a common shock and ²i;t is the error term. The de¯nition of the variables
will be clari¯ed in more detail in section 4.5. This model is estimated with
OLS10 and Newey-West robust standard errors to take into account serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity.
The dynamic nature of the model is important because it disentangles
the short-run from the long-run e®ects of trade integration. The short-run
is captured by Á3 while the long run is given by ¡
Á2
Á1. The decomposition of
the e®ect of trade integration between a short- and a long-run component
is important since a shock in tari®s will lead to short-run adjustment costs
(displaced workers, closed plants), while in the long-run, trade liberalization
will lead to e±ciency gains (stakeholders of competitive plants and users of
¯nal and intermediate goods) (Tre°er, 2004). The derivation of the short-
and long-run e®ect of this model is explained in Appendix E (Vogelvang
2005).
4.5 Data
In equation (4.1) the degree of export specialization (Exp spec.) is a
function of trade weighted tari®s (tari®), e®ective tax rate (ETR), institu-
tional reforms (I) and other control variables (Z) such as the business cycles.
This section gives an overview of the data and variables.
4.5.1 Export Specialization
A common measure for export specialization in the literature is the
Her¯ndahl index on exports (Sapir 1996)11. The evolution of the Her¯ndahl
10GMM will be used as a robustness check. However, since the time series are short,
the number of instruments are limited to two lags.
11We investigate here the degree of the so-called absolute specialization, i.e. the extent to
what a given country or region is specialized in a limited number of activities. This concept
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index of export specialization might reveal to what extent a given country
is becoming more specialized or diversi¯ed, regardless of how the economic
structures of other countries are evolving. A recent study has shown that
export specialization is a good proxy for industrial specialization (Laurin
2007).
The Her¯ndahl index is computed for each country i and each year t













A higher index indicates that country i exports in a smaller range of
sectors and hence is more specialized. To construct the Her¯ndahl indices,
yearly export °ows from 13 individual countries of Central and Eastern
Europe to the European Union on the 8-digit HS classi¯cation12 product
level were collected from Eurostat13for the period 1989-20001415. Using a
correspondence key, the data was translated to the 4-digit NACE industry
level16 (250 sectors). Note that we study only trade °ows to and tari®s from
the EU15. Since the EU15 is the main trading partner of the Central and
East European countries as illustrated in Figure 4.1, EU15-tari®s will have
the largest e®ect on export specialization in Central Europe and tari®s of
the rest of the world will not play a major role in our results.
of specialization directly relates to the concept of risk exposure. This contrasts with
relative specialization which measures to what extent the export or production structure
di®ers from those of the other (contingent) countries or regions.
12The Harmonized system (HS) is a classi¯cation system we use at the 8-digit product
level
13The Eurostat trade statistics is a high quality database containing annual data on
trade °ows to and from Central and East European countries.
14For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia data was available from 1992 onwards
and for Slovakia from 1993 onwards.
15Note that we collected trade data for all sectors, not only the manufacturing sector
16NACE is a European classi¯cation system.4.5. Data
4.5.2 Trade Integration
Most previous studies on trade integration use time dummies to capture
trade integration and thereby implicitly assume that trade integration is
linear over time. From Figure 4.5 we know that trade integration is not
linear, therefore we rather use tari®s to measure trade integration as in
Beine & Coulombe (2007) and Tre°er (2004). Yearly EU15-tari®s17 on the
HS 8-digit product level are collected from the Haveman database. These
data are available from 1989 until 2000. Since not all tari®s were available
for all years18, we replaced the missing tari® at time t with the tari® value
at t + 119.
The sectoral EU15-tari®s ¿k on exports from Central and East Euro-
pean countries are aggregated to the country level using the export share of















To test the robustness of this trade weighted tari®, regressions with
di®erent weights and two alternative measures for tari®s will be used in the
estimations in section 4.6.
4.5.3 Corporate taxes
Since the nominal corporate tax rate does not take into account tax
deductions for speci¯c investments, this analysis will include the e®ective
tax rate. The e®ective tax rate is a ratio of corporate taxes and pro¯t before
17 Only the preferential rates on export products from an individual Central and Eastern
European country was used, but when this rate was not available, we used the MFN (most
favored nations) rates.
18Only the years 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000 were available for most products.
19Estimations where we replaced the missing tari® at time t with the tari® value of time
t ¡ 1 did not change results
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tax collected from company accounts for 12 Central European countries20
(Vandenbussche et al. 2005), (Buijink et al. 2000) and (Nicodµ eme 2001).







The transition process also implied a drastic institutional change in
Central Europe. Institutions were reformed towards more market economy
standards. We will use two indicators of institutional reforms: enterprise re-
forms and competition policy reforms from the EBRD 21. These transition
indicators re°ect the judgment of the EBRD about country-speci¯c progress
in enterprise and competition policy reforms. EBRD Country specialists
propose a score for a particular country which is then discussed at length by
an internal committee within the EBRD. Each country gets a score between
1 and 4.3322 where 1 represents an institution with little or no change from a
centrally planned market and 4.33 indicates that the standards of an indus-
trialized market economy are implemented in the institutional environment
of the country. To assign these scores, the EBRD follows certain criteria for
each institution based on the following classi¯cation system in Table 4.1.
The enterprise reforms indicate to what extent the countries reduced
production subsidies and introduced e®ective bankruptcy procedures to be
more in line with market-economy standards. A country has a score of 1 if
there is no ¯nancial discipline at the enterprise level, this means that inef-
¯cient ¯rms receive generous state subsidies to continue production. When
e®ective bankruptcy procedures exist and credits are given to the most e±-
cient ¯rms, the country will receive a score of 4.33. The competition policy
reforms indicator concentrates on facilitating market entry and combating
the abuse of market dominance by monopolies. A score of 1 indicates that
20The tax and pro¯t data for Turkey was not su±cient available in Amadeus to calculate
the e®ective tax rate.
21EBRD is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
22The scores increment with 0.33, this means that the scale between, say 2 and 3, would
have the following components: 2;2.33;2.66 and 34.5. Data
Table 4.1: Institutional reforms
score enterprise reforms
1 if there are soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening
¯nancial discipline at the enterprise level) and few other reforms are made
to promote corporate governance.
2 if there is a moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement
of bankruptcy legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition
and corporate governance.
3 if signi¯cant and sustained actions are taken to harden budget constraints (tight credit
and subsidy policy) and to promote corporate governance e®ectively.
4 if substantial improvement is made in corporate governance
and signi¯cant new investment at the enterprise level.
4.33 if there are standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies:
e®ective corporate control exercised through domestic ¯nancial institutions
and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring.
score competition policy reforms
1 if there are no competition legislation and institutions.
2 if competition legislation and institutions are set up and there is some
reduction of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant ¯rms.
3 if some enforcement actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power
and to promote a competitive environment.
4 if signi¯cant enforcement actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power
and to promote a competitive environment.
4.33 if there are standards and performance norms typical of advanced industrial economies:
e®ective enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.
Source: EBRD reports
Note: the EBRD indicators are not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
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there is no competition legislation, a few dominant ¯rms control the market
and market entry is restricted. When a country achieves e®ective enforce-
ment of competition policy, meaning unrestricted entry to the market and
punishment of abuse of market power, a score of 4.33 is given. A disadvan-
tage of these indicators is that for some countries the variable does not vary
much over time. A detailed table on this data is reported in Appendix C.
A ¯nal remark should be made on corruption. According to Dixit
(2004), de¯ciencies of the law are especially present in less developed coun-
tries and in transition countries. The collapse of a strict communist system
and the transition to a market economy left some areas open for groups
to provide alternative institutions and economic rules. Therefore, it is im-
portant to what extent these institutional variables take into account cor-
ruption. A corruption index is collected from `transparency international
network'. This index assesses the level at which corruption is perceived by
businessman as impacting on commercial life. The index is based on several
surveys in a list of countries and lies between 0 and 10. A score of 10 equals
an entirely clean country, while 0 equals a country where business transac-
tions are entirely dominated by extortion. In other words, a higher index
equals less corruption perceived by businessmen in that country. Figure 4.6
illustrates that this corruption index is positively correlated with enterprise
reforms. A country with more advanced enterprise reforms has also less cor-
ruption. This suggests that the level of corruption is possibly already taken
into account in the institutional reforms measure.
4.5.5 Other control Variables
First, to control for business cycles in individual Central and East Eu-
ropean countries and the EU15, GDP data (EBRD reports, IMF database)
are decomposed in a growth trend and a cyclical component, the business
cycle, with the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.23
Second, the economic freedom index reports an index for hidden import
23Maravall & del Rio (2001) and Pedersen (2001) suggest that the smoothing parameter
of the ¯lter should be between 6 and 14 for annual data. Higher values produce smoother
results. In this analysis, we will use a value of 7 for the smoothing parameter. Results
with a smooth value of 14 are not reported here, but are similar.4.6. Results
Figure 4.6: Correlation enterprise reforms and corruption in Central Europe
Source: EBRD reports and transparency international network
barriers (HIB) other than published tari®s and quotas24. Since correlation
between the hidden import barriers index and our variable for trade weighted
tari®s is low (correlation = 0.0136), this variable can be included comple-
mentary to the tari® variable. This will allow us to control for other tari®s,
non-tari® barriers or quotas that are not captured by the tari® variable.
Final, two alternatives for the tari® variable will be used to measure
trade integration with the EU15. An indicator of trade liberalization from
the EBRD data will indicate to what extent there are no import or export
restrictions. The indicator of price liberalization from the EBRD data will
show to what extent there are no price restrictions in the country.
4.6 Results
Table 4.2 reports the main estimation results of our benchmark regres-
sion as in speci¯cation (4.1). Column (1) shows the results of a regression
with tari®s, control variables for the business cycle, country and time ¯xed
24HIB is only available for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 on a country-level
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e®ects. Since year dummies are not signi¯cant and do not change the result,
they will not be included anymore in the following regressions25. Regres-
sions (2) and (3) report the institutional reforms variables, enterprise reforms
and competition policy reforms, separately26 and reduce the analysis to 10
countries since the institutional reforms variables are not available for Malta,
Cyprus and Turkey. According to Acemoglu et al. (2005a) institutions in-
°uence a country's economic performance, but economic performance will
change the political power of groups in a society and thus change institu-
tions. Therefore, institutions can be endogenous. The regression in column
(4) instruments the variable enterprise reforms variables with its lag to con-
trol for possible endogeneity. The regressions (5) and (6) include the e®ective
tax rate (etr) of the country. Although the Hausman test did not ¯nd endo-
geneity for the e®ective tax rate, intuitively it is possible that the e®ective
tax rate is a function of export specialization. For a country specialized in a
certain sector, the government can decide to allow sector-speci¯c tax credits
to stimulate the production in this sector even more. Therefore, column
(6) instruments the e®ective tax rates by its lag and the o±cial tax rate to
control for this possible endogeneity.
We ¯nd very robust results in favor of a long-run relationship between
trade integration and export specialization (¡Á2=Á1)27. The long-run re-
lationship is negative, based at Table 4.2, column (2), a 1% decrease in
EU15-tari®s increases export specialization in Central Europe by 1.3%28.
This result supports trade theories suggesting that trade integration leads
to a long-run concentration of activities across regions and across sectors. In
the short-run, trade integration has no signi¯cant in°uence on export spe-
cialization (coe±cient Á3 is not signi¯cant). The lagged dependent variable,
log(export specializationt¡1), is negative signi¯cant suggesting that there is
25This is important because it suggests that our results are not driven by time trends
common to all countries.
26The correlation (0.72) between the enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms
variables is too high to include these variables in 1 regression.
27Using a Wald test, the ratio (¡Á2=Á1) is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (p-value =
0.0006).
28Estimations with more lags of the tari® and export specialization variables did not
change results and were not signi¯cant. Therefore, these estimations are not reported
here.4.6. Results
Table 4.2: Main regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV IV
Constant -1.4*** -0.74* -1.02* -0.71 -1.8*** -1.34*
(0.47) (0.44) (0.55) (0.45) (0.48) (0.8)
log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.4*** -0.42*** -0.6***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.17)
log(tariffi;t¡1) -0.49*** -0.58** -0.23 -0.27 -0.47*** -0.54*
(0.15) (0.28) (0.25) (0.29) (0.17) (0.29)
¢log(tariffi;t) -0.21* -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.2
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.18)
nat. bus. cycleit 1.47e-6 6.17e-7 -8.21e-7 9.26e-7 1.54E-6 1.8E-6
(1.74e-6) (1.38e-6) (1.80e-6) (2.24e-6) (1.83E-6) (2.87E-6)
EU bus. cycleit 0.001*** -0.0001 -.0001 0.0002 0.002*** 0.002***
(.0006) (0.0005) (.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
enterprise reformit - 0.28*** - 0.04 - -
(0.10) (0.17)
competition policyit - - 0.15 - - -
(0.09)
etr - - - - 0.32 -4.89
(0.43) (3.28)
time dum. yes - - - - -
country ¯x. e®. yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 121 91 91 91 101 91
F(pvalue) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.00
R2 0.40 0.4 0.35 0.23 0.41 0.51
Sargan (p-values) / 0.04
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. Time dummies are only included in re-
gression (1). Regression (2) and regression (3) only take into account 10 countries since data on
institutional reforms was not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. In column (4) IV is used:
enterprise reform is instrumented by the lagged value. In column (5) the regression includes the av-
erage e®ective tax rate per country and in column (6) this variable is instrumented by the lag of the
average e®ective tax rate. note:***, ** and * denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively
10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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no persistence in export specialization. A possible explanation for this ob-
servation is that export specialization is decreasing in the ¯rst years of the
sample period (see Figure 4.5).
Regarding the institutional reforms, the estimation results of Table 4.2
indicate that enterprise reforms have a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on
export specialization. This implies that an increase of one unit in enterprise
reforms, leads to an increase of 28% in export specialization. In contrast,
competition policy reforms have no signi¯cant e®ect on export specialization.
A possible explanation is that competition policy can in°uence the volume
of trade or exports, but does not in°uence export specialization in itself.
Moreover, stricter credit policies may imply that the least e±cient ¯rms will
exit the market and only ¯rms in the most productive sectors will survive. So
that export will be concentrated in sectors with a comparative advantage.
The last column of Table 4.2 lags enterprise reforms with one period to
overcome possible endogeneity. The coe±cient of enterprise reforms is still
positive, but not signi¯cant. Also e®ective tax rates do not a®ect export
specialization signi¯cantly. A possible reason is that our measure of e®ective
tax rates is too aggregated to capture to what extent speci¯c sectors receive
tax credits. The long-run e®ect of tari®s on export specialization still holds.
Our study con¯rms the result of increasing specialization in Central
Europe of previous studies using time dummies to measure trade integra-
tion (Hildebrandt & WÄ orz (2004) and Traistaru et al. (2003)). Moreover,
we extend their result to 13 countries in Central Europe and identify the
main drivers behind export specialization: trade integration and enterprise
reforms. A possible explanation why we ¯nd the opposite result of Beine &
Coulombe (2007) for Canada is the di®erence in the level of development of
the sample countries (Imbs & Wacziarg (2003), Koren & Tenreyro (2004)).
4.7 Robustness checks
In order to assess the robustness of our regression results in Table 4.2,
this section will report some extended analyses.
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.3 deal with possible
econometric problems. First, since the weights of the tari® variable could4.7. Robustness checks
be endogenously correlated with the Her¯ndahl index of exports, regression
(1) uses constant weights (average export share over the period 1989-2000)
in the tari® variable. The disadvantage of this constant weight is the loss
of variation over time. Therefore, column (2) uses the weight of the tar-
i® variable lagged by 1 period. We also need to consider the possibility of
non-linearities in export specialization. From Figure 4.5 we know that ex-
port specialization does not follow a monotonic pattern. Therefore, column
(3) controls for a non-linear relationship between tari®s and export special-
ization. Since corruption was especially a big problem during transition in
Central Europe, column (4) explicitly controls for corruption. Finally, re-
gression (5) includes a measure for non published import tari®s and quotas
(HIB).
The long-run e®ect of tari®s on export specialization still holds in
columns (1)-(3). Moreover, in column (3) a non-linear e®ect of tari®s is
positive, but not signi¯cant. A positive non-linear e®ect would imply that
a small decrease in tari®s at higher tari® levels, decreases export special-
ization. This could be the case for prohibitive tari®s. A decrease in a pro-
hibitive tari® will lead to more ¯rms exporting in di®erent sectors and thus
induce export diversi¯cation. Moreover, the maximum unweighted import
tari® in our sample is only 5.96%.
Another robustness check explicitly controls for corruption. The es-
timation in column (4) shows that the corruption index is not signi¯cant.
Finally, controlling for other tari®s (HIB) does not change previous results,
the estimation in column (5) implies that the tari® variable captures most
of the trade integration process between Central and Eastern Europe and
the EU1529.
Table 4.4 reports a second set of robustness checks. First, the sample
is reduced to the period 1994-2000 in column (1). This robustness check
excludes in°uences from a possible prohibitive tari® in the beginning of
transition and the heavily restructuring period in the ¯rst years of transition.
In Column (2), the regression is only estimated for the EU10 to test whether
Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, who have a di®erent EU-accession path,
29Other authors tried to proxy non-tari® barriers by a frequency index but failed to ¯nd
a signi¯cant in°uence on trade (Amiti & Konings (2007) and Mayer & Zignago (2005)).
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Table 4.3: Impact on export specialization for Central Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.84* -0.4 -1.09*** -0.53 -0.96
(0.51) (0.64) (0.44) (0.52) (6.65)
log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) -0.35*** -0.56*** -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.45***
(0.07) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
log(tariffi;t¡1) -0.41*** -0.84*** -0.58*** -0.12 -0.54***
(0.16) (0.33) (0.16) (0.26) (0.16)
¢log(tariffi;t) 0.13 -0.04 -0.42* -0.11 -0.18
(0.18) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.12)
nat. business cycleit -1.64e-07 4.12e-06 1.78e-06 9e-07 1.72e-06
(1.31e-06) (2.80e-06) (1.66e-06) (1.39e-06) (1.90e-06)
EU business cycleit .0006 -0.0003 0.001** -0.0003 0.001
(.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)
¢log(tariff2
i;t) - - 0.23 -
(0.17)
corruptionit - - - -0.09
(0.07)
HIBit - - - - -0.04
(0.87)
country ¯xed e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
obs 121 81 121 90 114
p value(F ¡ stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.58 0.46 0.38 0.41 0.38
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All models include country ¯xed e®ects. In
column (1) the regression uses constant export shares as weights for the tari® variable and in column
(2) the weights of the tari® variable are lagged by 1 period. Regression (3) takes into account a
non linear e®ect of tari®s on export specialization. A variable to control for corruption or for other
barriers (HIB) is included in column (4) and (5) respectively. note:***, ** and * denote signi¯cance
level of estimates at respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.4.8. Discussion of results
in°uenced the results. The results in Table 4.4 show that the long-run e®ect
of tari®s on export specialization holds in both cases.
Finally, Table 4.4 veri¯es whether our results are robust to di®erent
measures of trade integration and export specialization. In column (3) and
(4), the tari® variable is replaced by an index of trade liberalization and
an index of price liberalization respectively, both variables show up positive
and signi¯cant in the regressions. This con¯rms that more trade or price lib-
eralization leads to more export specialization. In column (5) an alternative
measure for export specialization is used instead of the Her¯ndahl index of
export specialization. Using this alternative measure of export specializa-
tion, the long run e®ect of tari®s still holds and even the short run e®ect of
tari®s is negative and signi¯cant. This con¯rms that trade integration has
led to more export specialization in Central and Eastern Europe during the
period 1989-2000.
4.8 Discussion of results
A recent study by Francois & Manchin (2007) examines the role of in-
stitutions, infrastructure and tari®s in explaining why some countries trade
and others do not. The authors show that basic infrastructure (communica-
tions and transport) and institutional quality matter more for exports than
tari®s. Our results showed that a decrease in EU15 tari®s by 1% induces
an increase in export specialization by 1.3%, while an increase of one unit
of enterprise reforms leads to an increase in export specialization by 28%.
A wald test could not counter the null hypothesis that the coe±cient of the
long-run e®ect of tari®s and the coe±cient of enterprise reforms are equal.
This suggests that both tari®s and enterprise reforms play a similar impor-
tant role in stimulating export specialization in Central and Eastern Europe
although the tari® e®ect is more robust.
Figure 4.5 in section 4.3 showed that export specialization in Central
Europe decreased until 1997 and then increased again. But this does not
necessarily mean that Central Europe specialized in the same sectors in 2000
than in 1989. In this discussion we would like to analyze how much of the
specialization in 2000 is associated with a change in the composition of total
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Table 4.4: Robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -1.56** -0.98** -1.17*** -1.18***
(0.67) (0.5) (0.42) (0.37)
log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
log(tariffi;t¡1) -0.55** -0.63*** -
(0.26) (0.17)
¢log(tariffi;t) -0.19* -0.21* - -
(0.11) (0.13)
nat. bus. cycleit -9.64e-07 5.25e-06*** 5.36e-07 7.99e-07
(2.19e-06) (1.69e-06) (1.29e-06) (1.28e-06)
EU bus. cycleit 0.002* 0.002*** -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
trade liberal.it - - 0.09* -
(0.05)
price liberal.it - - - 0.12***
(0.05)
country f. e. yes yes yes yes
obs 87 88 91 91
p value(F ¡ stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.41 0.41 0.58 0.37
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. Regression (1) does not
include the years 1989-1993, while regression (2) uses only the EU10 (not Turkey,
Bulgaria and Romania). Regressions in column (3) and (4) replace the tari® variable
by an indicator of trade and price liberalization respectively. note: ***, ** and *
denote signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.4.8. Discussion of results
exports. Therefore we follow Hoekman & Djankov (1997) who measure the
change in the composition of exports by calculating the simple correlation
between RCAs30 for each country in 1990 and 1995. A higher correlation
indicates that less change has occurred. Hoekman & Djankov (1997) ob-
serve little change in the composition of exports. Most countries of Central
Europe exported in the same sectors in 1995 as in 1990. We will extend
their analysis with our export data from 1989 until 2000. The correlations
between the RCAs for each country in 1989 and 2000 is reported in Table
4.5. The correlations are remarkably lower than in Hoekman & Djankov
(1997) which might be indicative of a change in the composition of exports
of Central Europe in 2000. To gain insight in which sectors the Central
European countries are specialized, Figures 4.7 to 4.9 compare the export
share in the manufacturing, agriculture and mining sector for each coun-
try in 1989 and 2000. The ¯gures show that all countries except Latvia31
increased their export share in the manufacturing sector, at the expense
of exports in the agriculture and mining sector. Within the manufactur-
ing sector especially exports in the transport, metals, electrical and textiles
sector increased sharply (See ¯gures in Appendix for an overview per coun-
try). According to Sinn (2006) more and more Western European ¯rms have
their products prefabricated abroad. By setting up their own manufacturing
plants in Eastern Europe (o®shoring), they make use of the low wages in
this region. While labor intensive upstream activities are shifted abroad, the
downstream stages of production remain in Western Europe and are even
expanded. A ¯rst glance on one of the expanding sectors in Central Europe,
the textiles sector, shows us that indeed Central Europe is mainly exporting
in labor-intensive sectors as preparation of textile ¯bres, textile weaving and
manufacturing of knitted pullovers.
A ¯nal issue to be discussed is whether tari®s decreased for all sectors.










where xij are exports in sector i by country j, Xj are country j's total exports, N is the
number of countries
31Latvia increased its export share sharply in the agricultural sector.
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Figure 4.7: Average export share in manufacturing sector in Central Europe
Figure 4.8: Average export share in agriculture sector in Central Europe4.8. Discussion of results
Figure 4.9: Average export share in mining sector in Central Europe
Table 4.5: Change in the composition of exports, 1989-2000
Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Latvia
Hoekman & Djankov (1997) 0.41 0.58
Our results 0.4 0.65 0.52 0.49 0.34
Malta Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
Hoekman & Djankov (1997) 0.89 0.80 0.32 0.68
Our results 0.55 0.43 0.55 0.33 0.11
Lithuania Slovenia Turkey
Hoekman & Djankov (1997)
Our results 0.22 0.63 0.71
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A study by Amiti & Konings (2007) analyzed the e®ect of reducing tari®s on
¯rm productivity in Indonesia. In their study they distinguished between
input and output tari®s. Their results show that reducing input tari®s
signi¯cantly increases productivity of domestic ¯rms and that this increase
is much higher than reducing tari®s on ¯nal good imports. We do not have
such a detailed data set as in Amiti & Konings (2007), but we can observe
in which sectors, tari®s decreased the most. Figure 4.10 reports the tari®
reductions in the period 1989-2000 per sector at 2-digit level NACE code.
We observe that tari® reductions are higher in the manufacturing sector
than in services.
Figure 4.10: Tari® reductions by sector, 1989-2000
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed whether the trade integration process between
the EU15 and Central Europe has led to more export specialization in Cen-
tral Europe. Moreover, we studied whether corporate taxes and institutional
reforms in Central Europe in°uenced export specialization. During the pe-
riod 1989-2000, we observed a gradual decline in EU15 tari®s on exports
from Central and East European countries (CEECs). Also e®ective tax
rates decreased from 1997 onwards and institutional reforms in Central Eu-
rope increased rapidly as a result of the transition process from a centrally4.9. Conclusion
planned to a market economy. We focused on two types of institutional
reforms: enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms. Both variables
indicate to what extent Central Europe restructured its institutions to more
market economy oriented standards. Enterprise reforms include credit and
subsidy policies for ¯rms, while competition policy reforms consist of abol-
ishing entry restrictions and dominant market power. The impact of EU15
tari®s, taxes and institutional reforms on export specialization in Central
Europe was analyzed using a dynamic panel model. This model enables
us to disentangle between a short run and a long run e®ect of tari®s. The
results indicate a positive e®ect of tari®s on export specialization in the long
run. Corporate taxes and competition policy reforms do not seem to have an
e®ect on export specialization. In contrast enterprise reforms play a signi¯-
cant role. An increase of enterprise reforms by one unit leads to an increase
of about 28% in export specialization. This implies that both trade integra-
tion with the EU15 as enterprise reforms stimulate export specialization in
Central and Eastern Europe.
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4.10 Appendix A4.10. Appendix A
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Figure 4.11: Her¯ndahl index per country
Source: Eurostat4.11. Appendix B
4.11 Appendix B
As an alternative to the tari® variable, two EBRD indicators on trade
and price liberalization are used. These indicators lie between 1 and 4.33
according to their achievement in reforms. The classi¯cation system for the
trade liberalization and price liberalization reforms are as follows:
Table 4.6: Trade liberalization
score Trade liberalization reforms
1 if there are widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate
access to foreign exchange.
2 if there is some liberalization of import and/or export controls; almost full current
account convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not
fully transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates).
3 if almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions
are removed and there is almost full current account convertibility.
4 if all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions are removed
(apart from agriculture) and all signi¯cant export tari®s; insigni¯cant direct
involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies;
no major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services;
full and current account convertibility.
4.33 if there are standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies:
removal of most tari® barriers; membership in WTO.
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Table 4.7: Price liberalization
score Price liberalization reforms
1 if most prices are formally controlled by the government.
2 if there is some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market
prices for the majority of product categories.
3 if signi¯cant progress has been made on price liberalization, but state procurement
at non-market prices remains substantial.
4 if there is comprehensive price liberalization; state procurement at non-market
prices largely phased out; only a small number of administered prices remain.
Source: EBRD; Note: EBRD indicators are not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
4.12 Appendix C
Methodology:
Equation 4.1 is an error correction model without explicitly including an
error correction term in the form of
4yt = ® + '1yt¡1 + '2Xt¡1 + '3¢Xt + ²t (4.6)
This model can be rewritten in an error correction form as follows:
4yt = ® + '1[yt¡1 ¡ (
¡'2
'1
)Xt¡1] + '3¢Xt (4.7)
'1 can be interpreted as the speed at which export specialization ad-
justs to any di®erence between export specialization and tari®s in the pre-
vious period. The short-run e®ect, the immediate e®ect that tari®s have on
export specialization, is represented by '3. The causal e®ect that occurs
over future periods, long-run e®ect is re°ected by ¡
'2
'1.4.12. Appendix C
Table 4.8: Enterprise and competition policy reforms data
Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia
year competition enterprise competition enterprise competition enterprise
1989 2 1 3 3 1 1
1990 2 1 3 3 1 1
1991 2 1 3 3 1 1
1992 2 1 3 3 1 2
1993 2 1 3 3 2 3
1994 2 2 3 3 2 3
1995 2 2 3 3 2 3
1996 2 2 3 3 2 3
1997 2.3 2.3 3 3 2 3
1998 2.3 2.3 3 3 2 3
1999 2.3 2.3 3 3 2.7 3
2000 2.3 2.3 3 3.3 2.7 3
Hungary Latvia Lithuania
year competition enterprise competition enterprise competition enterprise
1989 3 3 1 1 1 1
1990 3 3 1 1 1 1
1991 3 3 1 1 1 1
1992 3 3 2 2 1 1
1993 3 3 2 2 2 2
1994 3 3 2 2 2 2
1995 3 3 2 2 2 2
1996 3 3 2 3 2 2
1997 3 3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.3
1998 3 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7
1999 3 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7
2000 3 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7
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Poland Romania Slovenia
year competition enterprise competition enterprise competition enterprise
1989 3 3 1 1 2 3
1990 3 3 1 1 2 3
1991 3 3 1 1 2 3
1992 3 3 1 1 2 3
1993 3 3 1 2 2 3
1994 3 3 1 2 2 3
1995 3 3 1 2 2 3
1996 3 3 1 2 2 3
1997 3 3 2.3 2 2 2.7
1998 3 3 2.3 2 2.3 2.7
1999 3 3 2.3 2 2.3 2.7
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Figure 4.12: Export shares per country within manufacturingGeneral Conclusion
This dissertation studied corporate tax competition from a regional
and a country perspective. Although corporate taxes are set at the national
level, the e®ective tax can di®er across regions because of the variety of
tax rules, regional enforcement of the tax law or strategic tax competition
between regions. The main contribution of this thesis is empirical. Chapter
1 analyzed the impact of ¯rm characteristics, sectors and regions on the
e®ective tax rate of large Belgian ¯rms. The results reveal that during the
period 1993-2002, the e®ective tax rate of Walloon ¯rms is about 6 percent
lower than the e®ective tax rate of Flemish ¯rms. Another observation was
that Belgium follows the European trend of increasing e®ective tax rates
and decreasing statutory tax rates. In general, the average e®ective tax rate
during the period was 26%, indicating that large Belgian ¯rms bene¯ted
from tax advantages of approximately 14%32. A next step in regional tax
di®erences is analyzing strategic interactions between regions. Therefore,
chapter 2 looked at strategic interactions in corporate tax setting in Italian
regions for the period 1993-2003. The ¯ndings show that southern and
mountain areas in Italy have on average a lower e®ective tax rate than the
Northern region and that Italian regions set their corporate tax rates taking
into account the tax rate of related regions.
In a third chapter I tackled the question whether there is corporate tax
competition between EU countries. By setting up a two-country model, I
showed that there exists an inverse relation between distance and the inten-
sity of tax competition. Empirically, the results con¯rmed that tax com-
petition is indeed stronger for EU countries located relatively closer to the
32The statutory tax rate for large Belgian ¯rms during the period 1993-2002 was 40.17%.
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new member states, like Germany or Austria than for EU countries further
away from the new member states, such as the UK and Portugal. A ¯nal
chapter looked at corporate taxes from a di®erent perspective. Chapter 4
analyzed the impact of trade integration, institutions and corporate taxes
on export specialization in Central and Eastern Europe during the period
1989-2000. The results show a positive e®ect of tari®s and enterprise re-
forms, in terms of correct credit and subsidy policies for ¯rms, on export
specialization. Surprisingly, I do not ¯nd evidence of the role of corporate
taxes.
In conclusion, this dissertation shows that corporate tax competition is
not con¯ned to countries but is a phenomenon that can be observed at the
regional level within EU countries. While the corporate tax rate are set at
the country level, e®ective tax rates which measure tax expenses taking into
account the size of the tax base show large di®erences across regions within
one country. In addition, this study provides evidence of a spatial dimension
in corporate tax competition between the EU15 and the new member states.
Recently, several measures and proposals are provided to increase the
transparency of the corporate tax system and reduce discriminatory tax
regimes within Europe. The European Commission exposed 66 tax regimes
in the European Union as harmful tax competition. The reason was that
these regimes were discriminatory, in°uenced the location of economic ac-
tivity and disturbed the European internal market. As a consequence, these
tax regimes needed to be abolished or reformed. The policy implications of
this dissertation suggest that also regional tax di®erences within one coun-
try are present, suggesting that sectors and location within one country are
stimulated through tax incentives, such that the location of economic ac-
tivity is in°uenced and ¯rms are discriminated. The European commission
proposed a single corporate tax base for all EU-wide activities of European
multinational enterprises (a common consolidated tax base) to eliminate
pro¯t shifting and tax obstacles. A similar measure could be introduced for
companies with a±liates in di®erent regions within one country, ¯scal con-
solidation on a country level can help o®setting of losses in one region against
pro¯ts in another region and eliminate regional pro¯t shifting. Moreover,
the introduction of Central and Eastern European countries has changed the
146Conclusion
spatial pattern of tax competition. The results of this dissertation suggest
that tax competition between EU15 countries and the new member states
is stronger than tax competition amongst the EU15 during the period 1993-
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Dit doctoraat behandelt een vergelijkende empirische studie van ven-
nootschapsbelastingconcurrentie zowel op regionaal als op Europees niveau.
Niet alleen landen verschillen onderling, maar ook regio's binnen ¶ e¶ en land
kunnen grote economische verschillen vertonen. Dit doctoraat bestaat uit
vier hoofdstukken. De eerst twee hoofdstukken bestuderen regionale be-
lastingsverschillen binnen ¶ e¶ en land. BelgiÄ e en ItaliÄ e worden als voorbeeld
genomen in deze studies omwille van hun sterk verschillende regio's. On-
danks het feit dat de vennootschapsbelasting een federale materie is in deze
landen, kan de e®ectieve belastingdruk van bedrijven en regio's sterk ver-
schillen. Mogelijke redenen zijn de complexiteit van de belastingregels, be-
lastingsaftrekken voor bepaalde ondernemingen of investeringen in bepaalde
regio's en voordelige belastingsregimes. Een derde hoofdstuk onderzoekt be-
lastingconcurrentie tussen Europese landen onderling. Tenslotte, behandelt
hoofdstuk vier de invloed van belastingen, economische integratie en insti-
tuties op export specialisatie in Centraal- en Oost-Europa.
Een eerste hoofdstuk in dit doctoraat bestudeert regionale belastingsver-
schillen in BelgiÄ e. Deze studie, die uitgevoerd werd met gegevens van 12167
jaarrekeningen van grote Belgische ondernemingen, komt tot de conclusie
dat de feitelijke belastingdruk van een gemiddeld Belgisch bedrijf 26% in
plaats van 40.17% bedroeg tijdens de periode 1993-2002. Ook wijzen de
resultaten erop dat de feitelijke belastingdruk tussen 1993 en 2002 gestegen
is en dan vooral vanaf 1999. Een mogelijke verklaring is dat de overheid
vanaf 1999 de belastbare basis verbreed heeft om in december 2002 het be-
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lastingtarief te kunnen verlagen tot 33.99%. Dit is een fenomeen dat ook in
andere Europese landen geobserveerd wordt, namelijk het samengaan van
een verlaging van de belastingvoet enerzijds maar een uitbreiding van de be-
lastbare grondslag anderzijds om het e®ect op de begroting van het land te
neutraliseren. De resultaten wijzen ook uit dat Waalse en Brusselse bedrij-
ven relatief minder belastingen betalen dan Vlaamse bedrijven. Dit betekent
dat er geen sprake is van belastingneutraliteit in BelgiÄ e met betrekking tot
de locatie van een bedrijf. Vervolgens gaat hoofdstuk twee een stap verder
en analyseert of regionale belastingsverschillen in ItaliÄ e tot stand komen
omwille van strategische interactie tussen regio's. Aan de hand van een re-
actiefunctie kunnen we uitzoeken of de regio's hun e®ectieve belastingdruk
individueel wijzigen of hierbij rekening houden met de e®ectieve belasting-
druk van andere regio's. De resultaten wijzen uit dat regio's reageren op
wijzigingen in de e®ectieve belastingdruk van aangrenzende regio's. Boven-
dien wordt ItaliÄ e gekenmerkt door een groep van regio's met een gemiddeld
hogere BBP, betere infrastructuur en publieke voorzieningen en een groep
van regio's met een lagere BBP en een tragere industrievorming. De e®ec-
tieve belastingdruk in de eerste groep is bijgevolg 7 procentpunten hoger
dan in de laatste groep van regio's. Uit deze twee hoofdstukken kunnen we
besluiten dat belastingsverschillen ook op regionaal niveau bestaan en dat
regio's hun belastingen strategisch bepalen door rekening te houden met de
e®ectieve belastingdruk van gerelateerde regio's.
Het derde hoofdstuk bevat een studie die belastingconcurrentie in de
EU onderzoekt waarbij voor het eerst rekening wordt gehouden met de
nieuwe lidstaten. Deze studie ontwikkelt eerst een theoretisch kader om
de rol van afstand in vennootschapsbelastingconcurrentie te verklaren. Ver-
volgens wordt dit model empirisch getest door de reactie van de EU15 landen
op wijzigingen in de belastingsvoet van de nieuwe lidstaten te meten. Hierbij
wordt rekening gehouden met de afstand van de EU15 landen tot de nieuwe
lidstaten. De resultaten geven aan dat de geogra¯sche ligging tegenover de
nieuwe lidstaten inderdaad een rol speelt in Europese belastingconcurren-
tie. Landen uit de EU15 zoals Duitsland en Oostenrijk die op een kortere
afstand tot de nieuwe lidstaten liggen, ondervinden een grotere druk om
hun belastingvoet te laten dalen om geen bedrijven te verliezen aan deze
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Oost-Europese lidstaten.
Tenslotte, analyseert hoofdstuk vier het e®ect van economische inte-
gratie met de EU15, instituties en belastingen op exportspecialisatie in
Centraal- en Oost-Europa. Aangezien een verregaande exportspecialisatie
een grotere afhankelijkheid betekent van enkele sectoren, verhoogt dit het
risico op nefaste gevolgen van een vraagschok. Vooral met het oog op een
mogelijke toetreding tot de EMU waar het individuele monetaire beleid
naar Europees niveau geschoven wordt, kunnen sector-speci¯eke schokken
tot drastische gevolgen leiden. Daarom is het van belang om exportspecia-
lisatie van de nieuwe EU lidstaten te observeren. Deze studie toont aan
dat tijdens de periode 1989-2000, de exportspecialisatie van Centraal- en
Oost-Europa toeneemt naarmate de tarieven van de EU15 op import van
13 Centraal- en Oost-Europese landen dalen. Bovendien neemt exportspe-
cialisatie in deze landen ook toe naarmate er meer geÄ ³nvesteerd wordt in
instituties die markt-gedreven krediet-en faillissementregels ontwikkelen en
'corporate governance' in ondernemingen versterken. Er is geen e®ect gevon-
den van vennootschapsbelasting op export specialisatie.
Samengevat, besluit dit doctoraat dat belastingsverschillen niet alleen
tussen landen, maar ook op regionaal vlak bestaan. Bedrijven zijn bereid
om een hogere vennootschapsbelasting te betalen in regio's met een sterk
ontwikkeld infrastructuurnetwerk en publieke voorzieningen. Bovendien re-
ageren regio's strategisch op wijzigingen in de e®ectieve belastingdruk van
gerelateerde regio's. Er werd ook vastgesteld dat er een geogra¯sch patroon
in belastingconcurrentie aanwezig is, waarbij landen op een kortere afstand
van de nieuwe lidstaten zoals Duitsland en Oostenrijk, meer invloed van deze
landen ondervinden dan landen op een verdere afstand, zoals BelgiÄ e en Ne-
derland. In een laatste studie werd vastgesteld dat de vennootschapsbelast-
ing geen rol speelt in de exportspecialisatie van Centraal- en Oost-Europa.
Daarentegen zorgen economische integratie en de kwaliteit van instituties
wel voor een sterke exportspecialisatie in Centraal- en Oost-Europa.
Ter afronding, kunnen uit deze thesis enkele beleidsimplicaties afgeleid
worden. In 1999, besloot de Europese Commissie dat 66 ¯scale regimes
schadelijke belastingconcurrentie inhielden. Deze regimes bevoordeelden een
aparte groep ondernemingen, beÄ ³nvloedden de locatie van economische ac-Samenvatting
tiviteiten in de EU en kortom de werking van de interne markt. Als gevolg
werden deze ¯scale regimes afgeschaft of hervormd. De resultaten van dit
doctoraat tonen aan dat er ook regionale belastingverschillen mogelijk zijn
zodat bepaalde sectoren en regio's via de vennootschapsbelasting gestimu-
leerd of afgeremd worden en dus ook de locatie van economische activiteiten
beÄ ³nvloeden. De Europese Commissie stelt ook voor om een geconsolideerde
belastbare basis voor Europese multinationale ondernemingen in te voeren.
Een gelijkaardige maatregel op nationaal niveau voor bedrijven met ¯lialen
in verschillende regio's kan ook reeds op nationaal vlak winstverschuivingen
inperken. Verder heeft de toetreding van enkele Centraal- en Oost-Europese
landen het geogra¯sch patroon van belastingconcurrentie in de EU veran-
derd. De resultaten van dit doctoraat suggereren dat belastingconcurrentie
tussen de EU15 landen en de nieuwe lidstaten sterker is dan belastingcon-
currentie tussen de EU15 landen onderling.
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